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# The Ecclesiastical Review

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


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


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THE
ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW

TENTH SERIES.—VOL. IX.—(XCIX).—OCTOBER, 1938.—No. 4.

## IN WHAT STYLE SHALL I BUILD MY CHURCH?

SHALL we say Gothic or Romanesque or Byzantine, Classical or "Colonial"? Many writers on art to-day, including Catholics not a few, would answer this question by the equivalent of a *Nego suppositum*. "There is," they would say, "no question of styles at all. Styles are a thing of the past. To-day styles are a lie. Show your architect the site, tell him what you want your building for and how many people you want it to hold. Then let him design you a church according to specifications and forget the styles."

Such, more or less, is the challenge one hears from time to time in the name of what is called Modern Art. For, as my readers will be aware, there has been in vogue for some years past, let us say roughly twenty, a new style—no, that word is taboo, let us say a new art, manifesting itself, though diversely, in painting, sculpture, decoration, and architecture. Friends and foes alike commonly refer to it as Modern Art (with or without capitals), though some of the latter would prefer to call it modernist or modernistic. Controversy has raged in artistic circles as to whether this art is legitimate and acceptable, sometimes as to whether it be art at all. We might leave the artistic circles to fight it out were it not for the fact that this new art has emerged from the artistic circles and has invaded a sphere where it becomes the concern of all of us, namely, the church and sacred buildings generally.

I do not propose (save for a few words in conclusion) to set forth merely personal views of this subject, as they could have but little interest for readers. Instead, I propose to record

opinions and arguments put forward by competent and sometimes authoritative writers on either side of the debate. It would be a mistake to think that the protagonists of this debate are Catholic ecclesiastics on the one side, and artists, or at all events non-Catholic artists on the other; that it is merely a case of the Church defending herself against the invasion of a profane and worldly *Zeitgeist*. On the contrary some of the most ardent advocates of modern art, even of ultra-modern art, are to be found within the ranks of the Catholic clergy.

If I begin with a pronouncement of the present Holy Father I must not be taken as regarding him merely as a speaker like the rest on the side of the "Government" or of the "Opposition". Though this be hardly a question of faith or morals, still, were his statement decisively in favor of either side, we should hardly care to pursue the debate further. But the advocates of modern art in the church do not think it has ruled them out, and perhaps they are right. The principal pronouncement of His Holiness on this subject was made on 27 October, 1932, at the opening of the new Vatican art gallery. He said that the beautiful religious works of art which they had just viewed reminded them, as by an irresistible force of contrast, of "certain other so-called works of sacred art which recall and bring to mind the sacred only because they disfigure it to the point of caricature and very often to the point of real profanation, while they attempt to defend it in the name of the pursuit of novelty and the rationality of the work".

> But the new does not represent real progress unless it be at least as beautiful and as good as the old; and too often these pretended new works are sincerely, when they are not also unconsciously, ugly, and reveal only the incapacity or the impatience of that preparation of general culture, of drawing and design (this above all), of that habit of patient and conscientious labor, the default and the absence of which give rise to figurations or rather to deformations to which that same so-much-sought-for novelty is wanting, seeing that they resemble certain figurations which are found in the MSS. of the darkest period of the Middle Ages, when the good traditions of antiquity were lost in the invasions of the barbarians and as yet there had not appeared a gleam of renascence.
>
> Something similar happens when the self-styled new sacred art sets itself to build, decorate, and furnish those dwellings of God and houses of prayer—our churches.

Then he enlarges on the purpose of churches expressed in the words just used. If art does not keep account of that purpose it is neither sacred nor rational, since it does not respect its only *raison d'être.*

What he had already said indicated, he continued, his practical judgment about the thing called new sacred art. "All we ask is that the canon law as formulated in the Codex be observed, viz., that such art is not to be admitted into our churches and that still less is it to be allowed to build and decorate them, but at the same time all doors are to be opened wide to, and the warmest welcome given to, every good and progressive development of the good and venerable traditions, which have given every proof of their capacity to inspire *new* and beautiful form."

In a later address he returned to the fundamental motive for his " reproval and condemnation of that ill-considered and indiscreet pursuit of novelty which we have recalled and reproved in inaugurating the new Pinacoteca, viz., the confusion in the innovators' mind between copying and imitating. Dante says he was inspired by Virgil and even imitated him. But there was no question of copying." [1]

Since those words of the Holy Father were spoken, a distinguished Roman prelate who was for some years Apostolic Visitor to China, Mgr. Celso Costantini, published a little book entitled *Arte Sacra e Novecentismo* (Rome, 1935), *novecentismo* being the Italian name given to these very modern forms of art. He claims that his work is little more than a commentary on the Pope's pronouncements, but I venture to think it is a little more.

His purpose, he tells us, is not to pass judgment on the new art but to discuss its adaptability to sacred purposes and notably the building, furnishing, and decoration of churches. For sacred art—that is to say, art applied to sacred purposes—has its own definite end and object, its own laws, and cannot be divorced from Christian worship. It is thus, be it noted, a narrower term than Christian religious art, which latter is not necessarily associated with worship, whether public or private. Now he disclaims being opposed to the new and the modern as such. He accepts modernity but not modernism—that is, the work

[1] I have translated from the Italian report of this address as given by Mgr. Costantini.

of a particular school of the present day which claims to have revolutionized art and to have completely broken with tradition.

He on the contrary proclaims himself a traditionalist. "We are traditionalists," he says, "not in the sense of a literal return to antiquity in order to copy and make over again the works of the masters of the past, but in the sense of looking to tradition as a guide toward using with intelligence the conquests made by predecessors, and going forward along the path of art to fresh stages of progress. Tradition is a starting-point and not a goal. We must indeed pass on the torch, as in the ancient Greek relay races, but we must ourselves run and not stand still.

"Great art, like life, renews itself by discarding worn-out and stale elements, and assimilating new ones. But life preserves physiological unity and continuity. Tradition is for us a kind of physiological equilibrium. We want modern but not modernistic work. Now *novecentismo* rejects tradition or breaks with it. For instance, the architecture of the past was based on symmetry, equilibrium, form, balance. The new architecture rejects all that: it will not hear of styles—that is, the various forms of traditional architecture. It claims to be functional, practical, utilitarian. It almost rejects decoration, painting, and sculpture, relying for its effects on mass and simplicity of outline and the play of light and shade on flat surfaces."

Then Mgr. Costantini formulates his objections to the new architecture as applied to religious purposes. They are roughly as follows:

1. The spirit of the new architecture is alien to the spirit of Christianity.
2. It has not yet defined its own characteristics. It is indeterminate, formless.
3. It breaks violently the tradition of church architecture.
4. The claim of being functional, rational, does not hold as against the traditional architecture, for it also was rational; but it was also decorative.

Let us follow up these points a little.

He considers that the new architecture is too generic, too non-religious, in a word, lay, profane: there is nothing spiritual about it.

But ought not architecture to reflect the spirit of the day and is not that spirit utilitarian, materialistic, the spirit of the machine age? Well if that be really the spirit of the age, and it is so only partially, why should we *want* to express it in our churches? Is not Christianity in a sense always a reaction against the spirit of the world? And yet it is certainly right to adopt all that is good and sound; it is right to meet and cater for the needs of the times.

But note that both modernity and originality can be achieved without any violent break with tradition. The Church in her Art has always been abreast of the times, yet has not thrown over tradition. What we need is not revolution, but ordered and reasonable evolution. Architecture must keep ever renewing and enriching itself with fresh elements, but always preserving certain basic qualities—spirituality of conception, beauty of form, concreteness in representation, dignity and decorum of technique, intelligibility in its language — for it must *speak* through the eye to the mind. The church ought to be a sort of prayer in stone, reaching up to heaven and offering to God the best and noblest that man can produce. It must be ample, dignified, and beautiful. Jacques Maritain always insists on the *legibility* of sacred art.

It will not do to make functionalism, practicality, convenience, the be-all and end-all, as if there were question of offices, workshops, and factories. Such buildings, for instance, can get on pretty well without painting and sculpture. But in a church painting and sculpture are an element of public worship, they have a definite rôle to play even apart from decoration.

The new architecture would offer us as it were bare bones. But these are no more sufficient in church architecture than they would be in the representation of the human body. We want something more than a skeleton or a mere framework.

Mgr. Costantini's own preferences, so far as Italy is concerned, are for the classical style of the Renaissance in its soberer moods. And I may say in passing that one of the most beautiful modern churches I have seen was a church in this style just completed in an outlying district of Rome.

He deprecates all mere copies of ancient buildings and in particular of Gothic or Romanesque buildings, even if they *could* be satisfactorily copied in modern conditions.

So far there has been question only of architecture. But in other chapters of his book our author discusses painting, sculpture, and the minor arts. For the moment, however, we are concerned with architecture only.

It is to be noted that, so far from rejecting all except the forms of church architecture familiar to us in Europe, Mgr. Costantini, while in China, advocated and promoted the adaptation of the Chinese style for Christian churches.[2]

That matter of functionalism which has cropped up in the bare outline I have just given of Mgr. Costantini's views was dealt with in an article in the review called the *Colosseum*, some time ago.[3]

> What is modernism in Architecture? Glib trivialities about function and functionalism have simplified the architectural problem out of all truth. We are led to believe that, given a practical structure built solely for "operational-value," man will be satisfied; for there (they say) he will have fundamental beauty. He will sit as it were on a steel stool in a structurally perfect house repeating wistfully to himself: Use is beauty and beauty use.
>
> It sounds so disarmingly simple, but is it? This is surely the view of function distorted in the reaction against purely *cultural* architecture; architecture was to be a science not a cultural occupation. But function surely implies more than that, for after all man must be *emotionally* satisfied as well as physically and it is as much a part of efficient designing to cater for the comfort of man's senses and mind as it is to shelter him, with a margin of safety worked out to four points of decimals, between a canopy of concrete and a fireproof floor. Color and texture, proportion and surprise are all essential elements of good design, and true functionalism must include them as well as structure and sanitation.
>
> What modernism has done is this. It has brought together "architecture" and the latest advances of structural (engineering) science; also it attempts to adjust the elements of design in every detail, including furniture, to suit modern conditions.

If this can be said even of domestic architecture, how much more of church architecture?

[2] See his little book *L'art chrètien chinois.*

[3] June 1935, p. 140.

And now let us consider the point of view of the well-known American artist who is conservative but by no means a copyist of the past, traditionalist but enterprising and original—Ralph Adams Cram.

In his book *My Life in Architecture*,[4] he writes: " When that nervous fad for abnormality called, and quite accurately, modernism came from an exhausted and disillusioned Europe, it received a ready welcome here."

Immediately the intelligentsia scrapped its previous standards. He thinks this was purely fashion and fad and is already passing. " To explain and justify ' modernistic " and ' functional ' architecture and surrealist art an entirely new vocabulary has been invented, an entirely new scheme of reasoning has been devised."

He admits that Modernism in art has its place because it does express this modern age, which is hardly more than fifty years old; whereas behind it lies a unified culture of nearly 5,000 years. Modern art is the creation and the manifestation of this half century; no more. It has no connexions with the past. The art is exact, significant and adequate—for those phenomena which are the consequence of the mental, moral, and material development of the last fifty years. " For a stock exchange or a department store, a moving picture palace, a garage, or a hangar, a skyscraper, a cocktail bar . . . it would be as irrational . . . to revive the motives and forms of past ages as it would be to design a fresh railroad train, a Byzantine motor car, a Gothic battleship, or a Renaissance airplane." [5]

Then he deals with the question as to whether the new art so used must needs be ugly, any more than a motor car or an airplane need be ugly. The inferior imitators of Matisse, Cézanne, and Rodin seem to think so. But why should it be so!

In any consideration of modernistic art it is necessary to draw this dividing line between the ugly and the beautiful. Products of the pathological type are not to be taken as typical of the movement, for within certain limits Modernism has produced real beauty, though " I have seen very few examples of explicitly modern architecture in France, Germany, and Holland which are not either wrong-headed or degenerate." But he goes

[4] Boston: Little, Brown, 1936. Ch. XV. (Tradition plus Modernism).

[5] Ibid., p. 267.

on to pay a tribute to accomplishment of real beauty in the minor arts.[6]

We must surely agree with him when he writes: " Modernist art is neither to be accepted nor rejected as a whole, but the good must be salvaged from the bad, the silly, ugly, and diseased examples of a false and poisonous type of Modern pathological aberrations."

What, then, are the limits of modernistic design? Modern things demand modern expression — granted. But age-old eternal things demand something more, such things as *home life, educational life, religious life.*

*Domestic architecture.* The cubist, functional house is a contradiction in terms. For example, the work of Le Corbusier in France is " the realization of the unquiet dreams of a mechanical engineer or an overwrought mathematician," with its glass walls and angle window-lights, fixtures in baseboards and columns, furniture of metal rods, bent into all sorts of shapes. This may do for the human society of the cocktail bar, speak-easy, night club, jazz, etc., but not for the Christian home, which has never been a ' machine for living '.—Just as I think it would be absurd to build a school of mechanical engineering or a chemical laboratory after the stylistic fashion of an Oxford college, or a gymnasium like a medieval abbey, so I hold it is equally absurd . . . to couch a school of liberal arts or a college chapel in terms of a garage, a department store, or a skyscraper office building."

Why? Because the liberal arts with theology are as old as man, whereas the embodiments of mechanistic and technocratic civilization are no older than I am. The liberal arts of age-long human culture have nothing to do with the current fifty or seventy years old technological civilization. Education is a tradition unbroken from the beginning. If this be true of education, it holds equally in religion. Its ethos is not that of physical, material, or even mental activity. Continuity is of its essence (tradition), yet this does not prevent adaptability.

In the case of Christianity the line of artistic succession must be preserved—not necessarily the stylistic line, but any of the great styles may be taken as basis and starting-point.

[6] Ibid., p. 270.

For the same reason the modernistic style used of late and, most unaccountably, for certain Catholic churches in France and the United States, must absolutely be eschewed.

Then (p. 279) he answers the argument that, since past ages have manifested their spirit through one style that held for everything, both religious and secular, so ought we to do. The answer is they had substantial unity—social, economic, political and spiritual. We have none. Nor is there a consistent, unified, and exclusive Modernism. What we must do is to adapt the traditional to the modern consciousness. He has an amusing and forcible passage on modern so-called religious art, e. g. *Epstein*. " If a Semitic stone-cutter sees fit to magnify a Congo fetish into a Paleolithic image 12 ft. high, put on its head a rudimentary crown of thorns and call it Ecce Homo, it is *not* his own affair but an offence and an outrage in the name of art as well as in that of religion."

One last quotation (pp. 307-8): "All the art of the world, beyond the painted pottery and other artefacts of Neolithic man, all the architecture, painting, scultpure, music, came into being under the religious impulse and grew great and even glorious under the influence of definite dogmatic religions and for the service of these religions." All Christian art of whatever kind in its old estate for a thousand years, in its new acceptance for the last century, was originally the creation of the Catholic Faith through the Catholic Church—Protestantism could only destroy and later imitate. Catholicism had been the creative force.

Ralph Adams Cram, it will be remembered, contributed in 1929 to the Calvert Series a little book on *The Catholic Church and Art* edited by Hilaire Belloc.

I make no apology for the length of these quotations, as they seem to me to express in a striking way the conservative but not ultra-conservative viewpoint on our present subject. In one of a series of broadcast talks last autumn Sir Eric Maclagan, Director of the Victoria and Albert Museum, put this conservative viewpoint in a very moderate form. Among other things he said: " The idea that one kind of art is suitable for religious buildings or pictures and another kind for secular buildings and pictures hardly dates back for more than a century or so, and has certainly had unhealthy results, for if Christian

sacred art is divorced from the normal art of the time, Christianity itself may seem to be a thing outside normal life."

On the other hand he said: "Provided that artists can work without restraint in the manner of a past generation it would be pedantic to forbid them an opportunity of doing so. — A liking for the familiar ought never to be allowed to keep the greatest contemporary art outside the service of Christianity: only the best is good enough for Christ."

The advocates of modern art *à outrance* would certainly not agree with Sir Eric that a modern artist can laudably or even permissibly work in the style of a past generation. We may take as a typical partisan of the new and the newest art a French writer already named above, M. Le Corbusier. One of his works has been translated into English under the title *Towards a New Architecture*.[7] The writer of the Preface, Frederick Etchells, sums up very well certain notions more fully developed in the book.

> An architecture of our own age is slowly but surely shaping itself; its main lines become more and more evident. The use of steel and reinforced concrete construction; of large areas of plate glass, of standardized units (as for example in metal windows); of the flat roof; of new synthetic materials and new surface treatments of metals that machinery has made possible; of hints taken from the aeroplane, the motor-car, or the steamship where it was never possible from the beginning to attack the problem from the academic standpoint—all these things are helping to produce a twentieth century architecture.
>
> A certain spareness of mass and outline, a crisscross or "gridiron" treatment with an emphasis on the horizontals, an extreme bareness of wall-surface, a pervading austerity and economy, and a minimum of ornament; these are among its *characteristics*.

As for M. Le Corbusier himself, here are some of his *dicta* which have been echoed by other writers of his school: "Architecture is stifled by custom (tradition). The 'styles' are a lie. Style is a unity of principle animating all the work of a period, the outcome of a state of mind which has its own special character. . . . The Plan proceeds from within to without; the ex-

[7] London: Rodker, 1927.

terior is the result of an interior. . . . *The house is a machine for living in* . . . It will be beautiful in the same way that the working tools and instruments that accompany our existence are beautiful."

He says that if we challenge the past we shall learn that the old codes have been upset, that " styles " no longer exist for us, that a style belonging to our own period has come; and that there has been a revolution.

He admires *engineers.* They are the true models. " The engineer inspired by the law of economy and governed by mathematical calculations puts us in accord with universal law." He also advocates mass production. " Mass and surface are the elements by which architecture manifests itself. Mass and surface are determined by the plan. . . . Cubes, cones, spheres, cylinders, or pyramids are the great primary forms which light reveals to advantage. Egyptian, Greek, or Roman architecture is an architecture of prisms, cubes, and cylinders, pyramids or spheres—Gothic architecture is not. It is for this reasons that a cathedral is not very beautiful " (p. 29). He greatly admires, however, American grain elevators and factories. "Architecture is the masterly, correct, and magnificent play of masses brought together in light." " When a thing responds to a need it is beautiful " (p. 110).

It was this M. Le Corbusier whom, as we have seen, Mgr. Costantini in his defence of tradition singled out as an extreme advocate of the new modern art. He has a considerable following not only in France but in other countries. And there are not a few architects such as Diego Rivera in Mexico who are quite as revolutionary in theory and practice. Catholic writers may not go all the way with him in applying his theories to church architecture, but there are those who go a good deal of the way. Despite the liberality of the editor I have space here to deal with only a very limited number.

Prominent among them is Canon Arnaud d'Agnel whose finely produced work *L'Art religieux moderne* [8] appeared in 1936. He begins it with the challenging question: " Quelle doit être l'architecture des églises catholiques? " And he answers without hesitation, " La moderne ", adding at once his

[8] 2 vols. Grenoble: Arthaud.

reason, " for it alone is in the spirit of our time and is best adapted to its needs."

That is the first answer. But we must not stop there. The nature and purpose of the Catholic church must be manifested in its structure and decoration inside and out. It must be not only modern art but sacred art—that is, in conformity with theology and liturgy. A church is neither artistic nor modern if it be not clearly distinguishable from profane buildings. Because, if it is not, it is irrational and mendacious, not being what it ought to be.

On the other hand a church in complete harmony with the principles laid down by the Holy See and the bishops is not the ideal for our period if it takes no account of the rules of modern art.[9]

If the architects of the nineteenth century have built (with a few exceptions) only copies and pastiches, that is because of the decadence of Christianity.

To-day how many churches in concrete, judged ugly or profane under the first impression of surprise, are for the most part accepted and admired by many—for example, N. D. du Raincy.[10] He goes on to describe the nature and characteristic of Modern Art.

*I.* It is simply *human* or at least *European,* i. e., it is not the reflexion of one people only, not the expression of a race, nor of a school, nor of an individual. It is universal rather than national.

*II.* It is *rational.* Intellect must play the leading part in every artistic work, not manual dexterity or technique.

*III.* It is *necessary.* It is not a matter of taste or of fashion, it is a result of the economic and social necessities of a new world.

[9] I must leave to the worthy Canon the entire responsibility for this statement and the one which follows it. As regards the former, doubtless he means to say that the Holy See, provided the requirements of worship are fully carried out, has left the matter of artistic styles an open question. Therefore one is free to express such a judgment as this. As to the second I fear I cannot agree. If in some countries there was a certain decadence of Catholicism during the nineteenth century, there was none in others—rather the contrary. Yet in these other countries the state of ecclesiastical art was as bad (if it can be said to have really been bad) as in those countries where the alleged decadence took place. Ireland seems to me a case in point.

[10] In the French Catholic review *L'Art Sacré* (Oct., 1937, p. 107), this church is described as " le plus beau morceau d'architecture religieuse de notre temps."

This new necessity arises also out of new discoveries and new adaptations of materials.

Its adaptation to the needs of our period ought to be so perfect as to give the impression of *beauty*.

*IV*. Unlimited extension of the notion of artistic beauty. Anything, however humble, is beautiful if it is exclusively and perfectly what it ought to be. But this beauty is not properly speaking artistic.

*V*. The pursuit of truth and of truth manifest in every respect. They want all their works to be and to appear what they are.

*VI*. No opposition between beauty and utility. Beauty presupposes utility. Thus a glass, however precious its material and however exquisitely it be wrought, is not beautiful if its form makes it too difficult to handle. Of course, utility is not beauty but the necessary condition for beauty.

There are those who go so far as to say that everything that perfectly fulfils a need is *ipso facto* beautiful. The best advocates of the new art do not admit this. They see an abyss between the useful and the beautiful. One speaks only to the senses and the mind; the other gives the esthetic emotion.

*Reasons for adopting Modern Architecture in churches* (Ch. IV). For Catholicism to oppose modern art would be in contradiction with its whole tradition, viz., that the ecclesiastical authorities have always utilized the art of the period and of the place for the building and decoration of sacred edifices. Hence their general resemblance to profane edifices.

But this resemblance was always only partial. Christian churches outside, but especially inside, were always distinguishable from lay buildings—sculptures, painting, mosaics, stained glass, etc., set them apart for their peculiar purpose.

What should remain permanent in the tradition of Christian art is not this style or that, but the evidence of worship and the adaptation of the building to that purpose.

*Theological reasons*. Catholic theology emphasizes the wonderful adaptability of the church to times and peoples and consequently to their art. To-day we are accused of being " behind the times," out of date and so forth. Let us reply by boldly adopting all that is good in modern ideas, including art, which is a reflexion of modern life. There was a time when Gothic

was a new-fangled thing, but the Church made it her own. She was wont to hand over the work to the artists of the day and gave them a very free hand—almost to the verge of licence.

Note that the Benedictines are everywhere favorable to the new esthetics and deal with it indulgently.

*Liturgy.* The two main purposes of a Catholic church are the Mass and preaching: therefore the two main features ought to be the altar and the pulpit—and next come the baptismal font, the communion rails, and the organ; these features ought to be adapted to their particular end, prominent and visible.

Modern architects accomplish this. (But so do classical architects of the Renaissance.)

Again, modern art frees the artist from the slavery of archeology and the craze for copying, so that nothing prevents him from adapting his work to the exigencies of worship.

Again, the modern simplicity and absence of useless ornaments make suitable background for Christian worship.

The modern artist wants nothing on the altar but the tabernacle and six candlesticks and the crucifix. They also favor curtains of liturgical color behind and beside the altar. But no fal-lals or gimcrack decorations.

*Social reasons.* The cheapness and adaptability render possible the *cité paroissial*, i. e., the grouping together round the church of various parish charities and institutions, making clear to all the social character of Catholicism.

*Economic reasons.* Obvious. Reinforced concrete is cheap, solid, durable, and capable of great variety of treatment.

Then he goes on to consider modern art from the point of view of theology (dogmatic, moral, and mystical), of liturgy and canon law.

Pius XI has given modern artists proofs of his solicitude. " Pas un mot de son discours du 27 Oct., 1932, compris comme il doit l'être, n'est décourageant."

His outlook for the future of modern art is very optimistic. Taken as a whole, this book is, perhaps, the most noteworthy contribution to the discussion that has yet appeared.

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[TO BE CONTINUED.]

## COHABITATION AS BROTHER AND SISTER.

WHEN A CONFESSOR finds a case of invalid marriage, his manuals of moral theology and canon law will give him detailed instructions as to how and when to apply the three more frequently used remedies, namely, revalidation, dissimulation, and declaration of nullity. There remains, however, a fourth remedy, fraternal cohabitation, by which the parties are permitted to live together as brother and sister. Perhaps every pastor or confessor at some time discovers a case in which cohabitation of this sort, if permissible, would be the solution of a tragic situation; but he probably remains uncertain as to what he can do about it, for his manuals say little about this remedy, and that little in only general terms.

Moralists and canonists are unanimous in stating that fraternal cohabitation is seldom to be recommended; some say *raro*—thus Vermeersch-Creusen, Merkelbach, Sporer-Bierbaum, Marc-Gestermann-Raus; others say *rarissime*—thus Genicot-Salsmans, Payen; others *fere nunquam*—thus Aertnys-Damen, Gasparri, Vlaming, Cappello. But in this context the expressions used do not seem to indicate a graduation from leniency to severity in the opinions held by the authors mentioned; they all apparently mean that, as Chelodi and Wernz-Vidal say, fraternal cohabitation is permissible only in extraordinary circumstances when no other remedy is possible. The rareness of the applicability of the remedy results merely from the fact that the requisite conditions are seldom verified. Since, however, cases can and do occasionally arise when the parties to an invalid marriage may be permitted to live together as brother and sister, a detailed analysis of the conditions will help to obviate guesswork and to supply definite criteria by which the extraordinary circumstances demanded can be recognized.

The requisite conditions are four: 1. that no other remedy be possible, 2. that the danger of scandal be removed, 3. that no proximate danger of incontinence remain, and 4. that the proper approval be obtained.

### 1. No Other Remedy Possible

Since cohabitation normally involves proximate danger of incontinence and scandal, it is permitted only as a last resort.

And since the other remedies of an invalid marriage can be reduced to revalidation, dissimulation and separation, as a rule fraternal cohabitation will be permissible only in the case in which 1) revalidation is impossible by reason of an indispensable impediment, 2) dissimulation is impossible because the impediment is known by at least one of the parties, and 3) separation of the parties is morally impossible.

1. *Revalidation Impossible.* The nullity of a marriage can result from a defect of form, or from a defect of consent, or from a defect of capability because of a diriment impediment.

a) In a case of clandestinity or *defect of form,* fraternal cohabitation is not permissible, for the marriage can be revalidated either by renewing the consent in the proper form, or by obtaining a *sanatio in radice.*

b) In a case of nullity by reason of *defect of consent,* revalidation is usually possible without difficulty, simply by renewing the consent, in the prescribed form if the defect is public. A rare case, however, can be found here, in which the marriage cannot be revalidated on account of human obstacles: Bertha, for instance, discovers that Titius's original consent was vitiated by a condition contrary to the essence of the contract, but she has good reason to fear that, rather than renew his consent, he will desert her if he learns that his defective consent rendered the marriage invalid. Hence it is practically impossible to revalidate the marriage by means of a renewal of consent. Neither is a *sanatio in radice* applicable here, for the *sanatio* cannot supply an essentially defective original consent, but only the ecclesiastically required renewal of consent, when the original consent was not defective. There seems to be no reason why fraternal cohabitation could not be permitted in this case, provided all the other conditions were verified, as they would be if, for instance, the children or the need of support made it morally impossible for Bertha to separate from Titius, and the proximate danger of incontinence were removed by old age or infirmity or anaphrodisia, etc.

c) In a case of nullity by reason of a *diriment impediment,* if the impediment is one from which the Church can and *does dispense,* revalidation is possible by dispensation and the proper renewal of consent, and hence fraternal cohabitation is not per-

mitted, except, in case of necessity, for a short time and with the proper precautions while awaiting the dispensation.[1]

Accordingly, cohabitation will not be the proper remedy unless the impediment is indispensable for the reason that the Church either cannot or will not dispense. Approved authors indicate the cases in which a dispensation is never granted, as well as those in which it is granted very rarely or rarely.[2]

Since fraternal cohabitation is only the last resort, it is not to be approved so long as there is any hope of obtaining the dispensation; and even in the case of certain indispensable impediments, e. g., public conjugicide, the very scandal which keeps the Church from ever granting a dispensation, likewise makes cohabitation illicit, even though separation of the parties involves grave difficulties.

2. *Dissimulation Impossible.* Even when a marriage cannot be revalidated, fraternal cohabitation is not to be recommended so long as both parties are ignorant of the nullity. In this case, if the confessor concludes from some remark of his penitent that an indispensable impediment unrecognized by the parties or others is present, he should keep silent and leave the parties in good faith, whenever he fears that they will not agree to separate or that the separation will cause grave spiritual or temporal damage.[3] As a result of this dissimulation, material sins will for grave reasons be permitted, but no formal sins will be committed, and hence the souls of the parties will not be injured; while, on the other hand, fraternal cohabitation normally involves more or less danger of both mutual and solitary formal sins, disastrous to the salvation of the parties. Besides, so long as both parties are in good faith, dissimulation can be used even in cases where the parties are so young and passionate that, if they once learned of the nullity, not fraternal cohabitation but complete separation would be imperative. The mere fact that an impediment is of divine law, is not of itself an obstacle to dissimulation. Thus Gasparri cites the following case: " Titius rem habuit cum matre vidua, inscio quidem Titio, sed non matre, quae filiam peperit. Haec nutrita et educata fuit extra

[1] Cf. Gasparri, *De Matr.*, II, 1183.

[2] Cf. Noldin-Schmitt, *Theol. Mor.*, III, 602, 565, 573, 577-579; Cappello, *De Matr.*, 443, 504.

[3] *Op. cit.*, II, 1182.

maternam domum; et cum ad XVII suae aetatis annum pervenisset, ducta est in uxorem ab ipso Titio, eius simul patre et fratre. Mater, conscientiae stimulis agitata, omnia confessario pandit, hic consuluit Ordinarium, qui reposuit coniuges relinquendos esse in bona fide." [4]

Consequently, when revalidation is impossible, fraternal cohabitation is not to be recommended unless at least one of the parties is aware of the nullity, thus rendering dissimulation no longer possible.

3. *Separation Morally Impossible.* Since fraternal cohabitation is not in itself a sin but is usually an occasion of sin, its permissibility is to be determined according to the norms governing occasions or dangers of sin. The moral impossibility of separating the parties is not, therefore, an absolute indispensable requisite demanded in every possible case; it is demanded only when the cohabitation constitutes an occasion in itself proximate which can be rendered remote only by the diligent use of precautions by the parties, as will be explained more fully below.

## II. No Danger of Scandal.

Just as the common good is to be preferred to the private, so also the common disaster from public scandal is to be prevented even at grave cost to the individual couple. Their cohabitation will cause scandal not only when it is sinful in fact, but even when, though innocent in itself, it has the external appearance of a sinful union; for even this will serve as an excuse to others in belittling their own faults, it will lessen their esteem of the sacredness of marriage and virtue, and it may even tempt them to imitate the bad example. But the principal scandal especially to be feared from even an isolated case of fraternal cohabitation would be caused not so much by the parties themselves as by the priest who would imprudently approve cohabitation in circumstances in which the people would look upon it as sinful. From this approval would result, not merely shocked amazement, but contempt and criticism of the Church and a serious lessening, if not complete loss, of faith.

[4] Cf. Cappello, op. cit., 841; Genicot-Salsmans, *Theol. Mor.*, II, 537; Marc-Gestermann-Raus, *Instit. Mor.*, II, 2081.

The danger of scandal from cohabitation will depend upon whether the nullity of the marriage is known only by the parties or also by others.

1. If it is known *only by the parties* (including, of course, also their confessor or pastor), obviously they can live together as brother and sister without causing any scandal in the community.

2. If, however, it is known *also by others,* then the nullity will be either public merely in the legal sense, or public in fact.

a) It is public *merely in the legal sense* when it can be proved before a court by documents or by witnesses. So long, however, as such documents remain hidden or remote, and so long as the few witnesses who could prove the impediment are discreet and friendly to the parties, no scandal need result from the cohabitation. Hence Vlaming says: "Quodsi, quamvis notitia nullitatis matrimonii sit publica in sensu iuris, nullum tamen reapse scandalum inde secuturum praevideatur—eo quod notitiam habentes sint probi, erga partes benevoli et discreti—ad evitandam oblocutionem e separatione interim oriundam, eius loco cohabitatio fratris et sororis instar putativis coniugibus permittatur, dummodo tamen earum indoles et dispositio id ferant." [5]

b) The nullity is public *in fact* when it is already known by the community, or (by analogy with can. 2197) when the circumstances are such that it can easily become known, because, for instance, some gossip has discovered the secret. Since the normal result in this case will be scandal, such cohabitation should generally be forbidden. But the question arises: May the parties ever be permitted to live together as brother and sister when the nullity of the marriage is public in fact?

If cohabitation in such circumstances were forbidden by the positive law of the Church, the answer would be No; for such a prohibition would be a law founded upon the presumption of a common danger, and positive laws of this sort bind even when in a particular case there is no actual danger; thus, e. g., the Church's laws on forbidden books and on mixed marriages.[6] There is a marked difference, however, between a positive law

[5] *Praelect. Iuris Matr.*, II, 757.

[6] Cf. Noldin-Schmitt, *op. cit.*, I, 170.

founded upon the presumption of a common danger, and a common danger without any positive prohibition regarding it. In the latter case, one is forbidden by the natural law to approach without necessity a common danger whenever it is real; but when in a particular case the danger evidently ceases, the prohibition also ceases. Thus, e. g., an aged and frigid man could without grave sin look at a picture which would be forbidden to younger people, simply because for them, but not for him, it would constitute a proximate danger of arousing passions. Hence Noldin says: "Si tamen essent (quod sane raro accidet), qui ex his actionibus nullum periculum paterentur sive motus turpis sive consensus in turpes delectationes, illae actiones pro iis solum peccatum otiosae actionis, sensualitatis, nullatenus vero peccatum contra castitatem continerent." [7]

Now since there is no positive law forbidding fraternal cohabitation when the nullity of the marriage is publicly known, the prohibition rests entirely upon the natural law commanding the avoidance of the danger of scandal and sin; and this prohibition, therefore, ceases whenever the danger evidently ceases. The question, accordingly, is not one of law but one of fact, namely, whether the danger of scandal and sin can ever be removed from fraternal cohabitation in these circumstances. Moreover, the question can be reduced to the matter of scandal; for the public knowledge of the nullity never increases the danger of incontinence arising from the cohabitation; in fact, it might at times diminish it, by forcing the parties to be more reserved and circumspect in their dealings with one another.

Gasparri implies that at times, even when the nullity is publicly known, means can be found which sufficiently remove the danger of scandal, when he says: "Si impedimentum non solum ambae partes, sed et alii cognoscunt, in primis partes separari debent, ratione scandali, quoad torum, mensam, habitationem, nisi cohabitationis separatio sit moraliter impossibilis et suppetant media, quibus sufficienter occurratur scandalo et incontinentiae periculo".[8] Although in this context Gasparri is speaking of temporary cohabitation while the revalidation or the declaration of nullity is pending, however, there seems to be no reason why, at least in some instances, the same means which can

[7] *De Sexto*, 51. [8] *Op. cit.*, II, 1183.

remove scandal for a time could not also remove it permanently when the separation is permanently impossible. In both cases the supposition is that the nullity of the marriage is publicly known.

But what means can be found to remove scandal from such cohabitation? The principal and often the only available means will be to inform the community that the parties are living together merely as brother and sister. An announcement of this sort, far from removing scandal, will usually increase it and start a wave of gossip sweeping through the parish, so long as the parties are still young enough to be subject to human passion. No matter how splendid their reputation for virtue, they will find few people willing to believe that they never take advantage of the opportunities afforded by cohabitation. But the case will be quite different, even when the parties are still young, if one of them is known to be a helpless invalid, e. g., a paralytic, physically incapable of marital relations. Moreover, when both parties are well advanced in years and have a reputation for virtue in the community, it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that the announcement of their fraternal cohabitation will remove all scandal that is not pharisaic.

### III. No Proximate Danger of Sin.

The danger involved in fraternal cohabitation will be either of both scandal and sin, or of scandal alone, or of sin alone. Any one of these three dangers will make separation of the parties imperative. But, since enough has been said above concerning the danger of scandal, what follows will refer to the danger of sin, when circumstances exclude all scandal.

Cohabitation as brother and sister does not always involve the danger of incontinence.

A. When in some rare cases there is only the *mere possibility*, but no real danger of sin, because, e. g., of very advanced age, cohabitation is permissible even though a separation can easily be arranged. As Noldin says: "Periculum, quod moraliter nullum est et merae possibilitati peccandi aequiparatur, vitare non tenemur, quia eiusmodi periculum, quippe quod in omni fere actione humana reperiatur, vitare non possumus: alioquin deberemus, ut ait Apostolus, de hoc mundo exire." [9]

[9] *Theol. Mor.*, I, 326, 3.

A danger or occasion of sin includes not merely an opportunity to sin, on the part of the circumstances, but also an impulse to sin, on the part of the persons. The danger is remote or slight when sin seldom results from it; it is proximate or grave when it frequently leads to sin. Hence a danger can be more or less proximate.

B. If cohabitation certainly involves only a *remote danger* of sin, no very serious reason is needed to justify it. Of such dangers Lehmkuhl says: " Occasionem remotam non auferre, etsi specialis causa eam subeundi, non adsit, ex se grave peccatum non est, modo maneat occasio *remota,* atque voluntas determinata sit ad repellendam tentationem, si qua oriatur ". Moreover, the following words of Lehmkuhl about venial sin are justly applied by Noldin (l. c.) not only to a proximate occasion of venial sin but also to a remote occasion of mortal sin: " Si illud, unde periculum oritur, actio in se honesta et utilis est, ex hac ipsa bonitate ratio sufficiens agendi habetur, ita ut illud aliquale periculum non debeamus attendere, sed potius remediis adhibitis nos ipsos praemunire; aliter enim innumerae actiones utiles metu peccandi impedirentur, quod non tam hominis cauti et timorati, quam pusillanimis est." [10]

Furthermore, sometimes an occasion which is proximate normally, i. e., for most people, will be only remote for certain persons, because of causes lessening the danger, e. g., advanced age, invalidism, impotence, anaphrodisia at least on the part of the man, and virtue.

a) As to age, no definite rule can be laid down, on account of the great diversity among individuals; but in general it seems safe to say that, even before advancing age has made a man completely sterile or impotent, the danger of sin can in some cases become remote by reason of the diminished ardor of passion.

b) As to when invalidism will render the danger remote, this will depend upon the circumstances and the nature of the illness.

c) As to impotence, though it removes the possibility of consummated sin, it does not always imply the absence or even a notable diminishing of desire, and hence the danger of sin will be proximate or remote according to the variation in individuals.

[10] *Theol. Mor.,* II, 486.

d) Anaphrodisia, frigidity or sexual anaesthesia, implying as it does the more or less complete absence of sexual appetite, thereby greatly diminishes or even entirely removes the danger of sin; it is said to be very rare in men, but very common in women.[11] Whether this estimate of the facts is correct or not, it is obvious that frigidity merely on the part of the woman, will not substantially lessen the danger of incontinence during cohabitation.

e) Virtue, combined with some of the above-mentioned causes, will greatly contribute to the lessening of the danger of sin, but virtue alone will seldom if ever suffice to render the danger remote; it will rather be a guarantee that the parties will diligently use all the precautions enumerated below by means of which a danger proximate in itself can be made remote.

C. When the danger of sin is *proximate in itself*, it will either be voluntary or necessary: voluntary, if the cohabitation can be dissolved " facile seu cum levi incommodo "; necessary, if the parties cannot be separated " nisi cum magna difficultate vel cum magno detrimento in bonis vitae vel fortunae vel famae." [12]

1. When the proximate danger is *voluntary*, fraternal cohabitation is never permissible, for, as Noldin-Schmitt says, " quicumque tenetur vitare peccatum mortale, ex eadem virtute tenentur etiam proximum illius periculum vitare: qui enim illud non vitat, cum possit, convincitur amare peccatum, cuius periculum amat ".[13] Moreover, in this case it is morally certain that the cohabitation will lead to sin; human nature alone will not be strong enough to withstand the grave temptation, and how can the couple expect God's supporting grace when they needlessly and rashly expose themselves to the proximate danger of sin? It is in cases of tempting God, such as this, that the old adage is literally true: " Habitare cum muliere eamque non cognoscere, est plus quam miraculum ".

2. If the danger is proximate but *necessary*, because the parties cannot be separated except with great detriment to themselves or to others, then the cohabitation will either certainly or only probably lead to sin.

[11] Forel, *The Sexual Question*, p. 223.
[12] Noldin-Schmitt, *op. cit.*, III, 399, 3.
[13] *Op. cit.*, I, 326.

a) It will *certainly* lead to sin when the temptations are so extraordinarily great that none of the natural or ordinary supernatural precautions will suffice; an extraordinary supernatural privilege, a miracle of grace, would be needed to keep them from sin. This would seem to be the case if the parties were still young and normal, but, on account of poverty, had only one room to live in. Of such a case Sporer-Bierbaum says: " Sed quaeso te, in eadem domo, in eadem camera et subinde ob inopiam in eodem lecto, an unquam extra praesentissimum periculum, praesertim si adhuc non senes expertae voluptati valde affecti sint? Nihil hic remedii praeter gratiam divinam implorandam et impetrandam piis mediis et devotionibus, singulariter ad sanctissimos virgineos conjuges Mariam et Joseph aliosque sanctos, qui in vero conjugio virginitatem sponte servarunt, ut dixi Henrici cum Cunegunde, Elzearii cum Delphina etc. Quae prudens confessarius suggeret; horrent pili, dum recordor vexationis, quam in simili semel habui per sexennium." [14] Since, however, apart from a special inspiration no one is justified in relying upon miracles of grace for his rescue, the rule laid down by Noldin seems more applicable here: " Si *certo* praevidetur in periculo commissum iri peccatum, nunquam licet ei sponte se offerre; ut hoc liceat, omnino requiritur, ut adsit fundata spes, fore ut cum Dei auxilio vitetur peccatum; certum enim peccatum absolute caveri debet." [15] And elsewhere the same author calls it presumption, " si quis confidit se consecuturum esse extraordinaria bona contra ordinem divinae providentiae, e. g. sanctitatem b. virginis Mariae vel maximi sancti, ad quam scit se non esse a Deo elevandum." [16]

b) If, however, it is *only probable* that cohabitation will lead to sin, then, even though the cohabitation in itself is a proximate occasion, it may be permitted, so long as the separation of the parties is morally impossible and so long as they diligently use the precautions by means of which an occasion that is proximate in itself can be made remote. Of such situations Noldin says: " Ex iusta causa licet *se exponere* etiam *proximo* periculo peccandi, dummodo aptae adhibeantur cautelae, quibus periculum fiat *remotum*. Qui enim ex iusta causa se exponit peri-

[14] *Theol. Mor.*, III, 445.
[15] *Theol. Mor.*, I, 326.
[16] *Op. cit.*, II, 51.

culo, non amat peccatum, sed causam bonam, ob quam periculum subit; ideo Dei auxilium, ne in periculo labatur, iure merito sperare potest." [17] Although St. Alphonsus is sometimes said to oppose this doctrine, his opposition really refers only to *voluntary* occasions, as is clear from his own words, when he says that a probable danger of sin " omnino est fugiendum, quando occasio est voluntaria; secus vero si necessaria ". And a little later he adds: " Et quamvis praeceptum vitandi occasionem proximam per se obliget ad non permanendum in occasione, tamen illud intelligendum est obligare, cum quis voluntarie in occasione persistit, non vero si maneat ex necessitate; moraliter autem haec necessitas intervenit, quando sine magno detrimento, aut incommodo nequit occasio dimitti; etenim tunc periculum formale et proximum opportunis adhibitis mediis ad non relabendum, fit materiale et remotum; non enim qui est in periculo, sed *qui amat periculum* (ut dicitur in *Eccles.* 3) *peribit in illo.*" [18]

In the case in question, the cohabiting parties can have a reasonably founded hope of receiving the divine graces needed to overcome temptation. They are not tempting God by needlessly and heedlessly remaining in the occasion of sin; for they are living together because of the moral impossibility of separating. Neither are they guilty of the presumption involved in expecting some extraordinary supernatural privilege, some miracle of grace; for their temptations are supposedly only those that can be overcome by the graces which God's ordinary providence destines for people of good will in proportion to their needs. If these ordinary graces were not sufficient, then the case would cease to be one of mere *probable* danger and become one of *certain* danger; for, when the graces of God's ordinary providence do not suffice, the only remaining means of preventing sin are the powers of nature and a miracle of grace; but it is morally certain that no one can long withstand grave temptation by means of the mere powers of nature, and no one has a right to force God to grant a miracle of grace. Within, however, the latitude of God's ordinary providence one is justified in expecting greater graces in proportion to one's legitimate

[17] *Op. cit.*, I, 326.

[18] *Theol. Mor.*, VI, 453, 455.

needs, as St. Alphonsus says: "Rationabiliter enim tunc esset sperandum fore, ut Deus augeat auxilium, ubi maior urgebit necessitas".[19]

Accordingly, the probability of sin in the case under discussion does not come from the lack of the natural and supernatural means to prevent it, nor from any present lack of good will and firm resolve, but merely from the human inconstancy which in the course of time may occasionally cause the couple to neglect some of the necessary natural and supernatural precautions. So long as they faithfully use the precautions prescribed, they are not actually living in a proximate occasion at all; the occasion which would be proximate in itself, becomes remote, for the precautions used lessen the influence it would otherwise have upon them.[20] It is only when they forget or neglect the precautions that the occasion becomes proximate again and draws them into sin.

This is merely an application of the principle of double effect. The cohabitation is a cause morally indifferent in itself from which can result, on the one hand, an evil effect, namely, sin; and, on the other hand, a good effect, namely, the preventing of all the disasters involved in separation. The morally evil effect is not necessarily but only probably connected with the cause, and it can be prevented by the use of the proper precautions; hence in willing the cause the parties do not have to will the evil effect. Moreover, in the moral impossibility of separation they have a proportionate reason justifying them in permitting the danger of the evil effect, especially since, by using the precautions, they can keep that danger remote.

The *moral impossibility of separating* does not always mean a difficulty in the supreme degree. "Non stat in indivisibili." It is to be taken, not in an absolute sense, but in proportion to the proximity of the danger of sin resulting from the cohabitation. Since the danger can be more or less proximate, so the difficulty involved in separating should be more or less grave, but always genuinely grave, to be able to justify the cohabitation.

When the cohabitation constitutes in itself a proximate occasion of sin, patently insufficient justifications or excuses would be, for instance, the mere fact that the parties are fond

[19] *Op. cit.*, VI, 453.

[20] St. Alphonsus, *op. cit.*, VI, 455.

of each other and accordingly would prefer not to separate, the fact that the pseudo-wife is a good cook or a good housekeeper, or the fact that she would not find another home equally comfortable and convenient. Innocent XI condemned the following propositions: " Potest aliquando absolvi, qui proxima occasione peccandi versatur, quam potest et non vult omittere, quin immo directe et ex proposito quaerit aut ei se ingerit ", and, " Proxima occasio peccandi non est fugienda, quando causa aliqua utilis aut honesta non fugiendi occurrit "; and Alexander VII condemned the proposition: " Non est obligandus concubinarius ad eiciendam concubinam, si haec nimis utilis esset ad oblectamentum concubinarii, vulgo ' regalo ', dum deficiente illa nimis aegre ageret vitam, et aliae epulae taedio magno concubinarium afficerent, et alia famula nimis difficile inveniretur ".[21]

In general, the moral impossibility of separating will consist in some proportionate detriment to the parties or to others, e. g., to their children or parents, " in bonis vitae vel famae vel fortunae ". Thus in a case of impotence where the civil law does not permit separation, Marc-Gestermann-Raus [22] cites from a decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, 15 Dec., 1877: " Ne (putativi coniuges) infamiam patiantur, bene eis permittitur simul habitare cum periculo tactuum ". And even where the civil law permits separation, a similar grave reason for cohabitation would be had if the separation involved the scandal and infamy of apparent desertion, because the reason for the nullity, e. g., impotence, could not be made publicly known without grave ridicule on the part of the community. Another grave reason would be the dependence of the woman upon the man for the necessary support of herself and her children, when his income would not be sufficient to support two separate establishments. St. Alphonsus says: " Communiter tamen affirmant DD non teneri poenitentem occasionem dimittere, si aliter grave damnum temporale passurus sit, dummodo interim sit paratus uti mediis praescriptis. . . . Ratio, quia occasio peccati non est in se peccatum, neque affert necessitatem peccandi; quapropter bene potest cum ea consistere vera

[21] Denzinger, *Enchiridion*, 1141, 1211, 1212.
[22] *Op. cit.*, II, 2009.

detestatio peccatorum, et firmum propositum non relabendi, ac adhibendi debita remedia ".[23]

The " debita remedia " or *precautions* needed to render the proximate occasion remote include both things to be avoided and things to be done. As to the *negative* precautions, it should be remembered, as Payen remarks, that " cohabitatio ut frater et soror excludit omnem vitae conjugalis usum, non vero communionem mensae et habitationis ".[24] Since the parties are only apparently married, but really single, they have no more right than other unmarried people to the usual conjugal freedom and familiarity in such matters as sight, dressing, touch, kissing, embracing and dangerous conversation. The usual negative precautions for people in the occasion of sin, namely, " non versari solus cum sola " and " fugere ab aspectu complicis ", cannot easily be applied to fraternal cohabitation, but in general the parties are obliged to do their best to avoid whatever can arouse their passions, and in particular, if possible, not to have adjacent interconnecting rooms; for, since " communio tori " expected of a married couple morally extends to cohabitation in adjacent rooms,[25] so " separatio quoad torum " should, if possible, exclude such dangerous propinquity.

Approval of fraternal cohabitation is, therefore, not to be given unless the parties seriously promise to avoid everything not allowable to brothers and sisters. Sporer-Bierbaum says: " Ipsique serio promittant et subinde (valde tamen circumspecte consulente confessario) etiam jurent vel voveant continentiam perfectam ab omni copula et impudicitia, quae solutis illicita." [26] This recommended oath or vow, however, can hardly be made a matter of obligation, for, as Noldin says, " confessarius non potest obligari ad praescribendum remedium, quod non est omnino necessarium, neque ius habet tale remedium iniungendi ".[27] The sincere promise is to be made by both parties, except in such a case as that mentioned by Vlaming, where both are advanced in years and only one party is aware of the nullity of the marriage: " Quoad coniuges putativos qui, in provectiori

[23] *Op. cit.*, VI, 455.
[24] *De Matr.*, III, 2518-21.
[25] Gasparri, *op. cit.*, II, 1107.
[26] *Theol. Mor.*, III, 445.
[27] *Op cit.*, III, 399; or in Noldin-Schmitt, III, 400.

aetate iam constituti, veluti frater et soror forte iam convivunt, ipsa illa alterius partis monitio omitti posse videtur ".[28]

The *positive* precautions commonly enumerated by the authors *are: diligens oratio, piam cogitationem fovere, lectio pia, quotidiana renovatio propositi non peccandi, frequentior usus sacramentorum.* Frequent Confession and Communion during the cohabitation will usually, if not always, be not merely a matter of counsel but a necessary means of avoiding sin. For, since experience has proved that people in general who rarely receive the sacraments seldom avoid all grave sin, these sources of grace are all the more indispensable to persons forced to live in the occasion of sin.

## IV. The Requisite Approval of Cohabitation.

The question here is whether a confessor or a pastor may approve fraternal cohabitation without referring the matter to the bishop.

1. Certainly the bishop is first to be consulted at least whenever the confessor or pastor *doubts* about the advisability of permitting cohabitation. Thus, while speaking of the four remedies of invalid marriages: revalidation, dissimulation, separation and fraternal cohabitation, Gasparri says: " Quodnam ex his remediis magis consultum sit, pendet ex circumstantiis, et in dubio confessarius et parochus consulat Ordinarium, eiusque instructionem sequatur ".[29]

2. But what if the confessor or pastor *has no doubt* that all the requisites are present, namely, that revalidation and dissimulation are impossible, that danger of scandal and incontinence is sufficiently removed, and that separation is morally impossible?

a) If the nullity of the marriage is *public,* the bishop is to be consulted. Thus Sporer-Bierbaum says: " Si quidem impedimentum ac nullitas matrimonii notoria sint, episcopis eorumque consiliariis ecclesiasticis cura relinquenda est, nec se immiscere debet confessarius." [30]

There seems to be no positive law expressly demanding consultation of the bishop in this matter, for, although the bishop's

[28] *Op. cit.*, II, 759.
[29] *Op. cit.*, II, 1181.
[30] *Op. cit.*, III, 442.

permission or approval is required in certain cases of separation (c. 1131), and before assisting at certain marriages (cc. 1023, 1031, 1034, 1091, 1104), and in some cases before entering into a second marriage (c. 1069), however, separation during a valid marriage is not to be confused with cohabitation during an invalid marriage, and the cohabiting parties are not obtaining a declaration of nullity nor a dispensation from an impediment nor a permission to enter into another marriage. Nevertheless, though the bishop's approval may not be expressly demanded by the law, it is required by the very nature of the case. The danger of carelessness or imprudence on the part of at least a few of the hundreds of confessors or pastors in a diocese, makes consultation of the bishop imperative in a matter like fraternal cohabitation, especially since only in extremely rare cases can scandal be sufficiently removed when the nullity of the marriage is publicly known. Besides, as indicated in can. 343, the bishop has an obligation " ad . . . bonos mores tuendos, pravos corrigendos, pacem, innocentiam, pietatem et disciplinam in populo et clero promovendam ceteraque pro ratione adiunctorum ad bonum religionis constituenda ". This obligation implies the right to the means necessary to fulfil the obligation. And how can he sufficiently guard against abuses and scandals in his diocese unless normally dangerous arrangements like fraternal cohabitation when the nullity is public, be submitted to his judgment before being carried out?

After speaking of cohabitation when the nullity is public only " in sensu iuris ", Vlaming adds: " Super quo iudicium in foro externo sit Ordinario, et in foro interno confessario ".[31]

b) Even if the nullity of the marriage is known *only to the parties*, Wouter says: " Si nullitas *aliis occulta* est, coniuges statim separandi sunt a *toro*. Interim si impedimentum cessavit vel dispensabile est, quamprimum procuretur convalidatio. Si impedimentum indispensabile est, recurratur ad Ordinarium, qui iudicet, qualis separatio procuranda videatur." [32] But Sporer-Bierbaum, in the passage above cited, after demanding consultation of the bishop when the nullity is public, then adds: " At vero si occulta et in foro conscientiae tantum ad confessionale

[31] *Op. cit.*, II, 757.

[32] *Theol. Mor.*, II, 836.

allata, hoc opus, hic labor, hic sudor confessarii." This opinion could be defended on the ground that, since the secret about the nullity excludes the danger of scandal, the confessor is the judge *in foro interno* in this as in other matters as to the danger or occasion of sin. For the bishop's approval of fraternal cohabitation is not a dispensation requiring the exercise of jurisdiction . . . there is no positive law forbidding cohabitation, to be dispensed from; neither is there a positive law demanding his permission as a requisite for licit cohabitation. His permission, or rather approval, is required only in so far as it may be necessary in order to guard against public scandals in his diocese.

### Absolution of the Parties.

One more question still remains: When can absolution and Holy Communion be given to parties living together as brother and sister?

1. Whenever all the above-described conditions for *permissible* cohabitation are verified, there is no reason why the parties cannot be given absolution and Communion at once, for their living together involves no proximate danger of sin or scandal. Vermeersch says: " Si (poenitens) nulla certa obligatione tenetur, *ius suum* ad absolutionem recipiendam *servat.* Nec in potestate est confessarii ut obligationem novam addat aliquo praecepto suo ".[33]

If, of course, by their invalid marriage the parties have incurred some censure, this must first be removed; thus, e. g., can. 2319, concerning marriage before a non-Catholic minister, and the third Council of Baltimore, n. 124, concerning attempted marriages following a civil divorce. Both excommunications are reserved to the Ordinary.

If, after cohabitation has continued for some time, the confessor finds that, although there has been no scandal, the parties have occasionally fallen into sin, must he refuse absolution unless they agree to separate at once? Noldin gives the following answer to cases of this sort: " Si constitutus in occasione proxima necessaria post plures confessiones cum iisdem peccatis absque ulla emendatione redit, non est absolute exigendum, ut occasionem deserat, sed adhuc absolvi potest, si serio velit adhibere media, quibus occasio ex proxima fiat remota: posita enim

[33] *Theol. Mor.*, III, 542.

hac voluntate sufficienter dispositus est, etsi occasionem removere nolit. Utrum in casu particulari exigenda sit occasionis dimissio an enixius commendandus sit usus mediorum, prudentiae confessarii relinquendum est; generatim dici potest exigendum non esse, ut dimittatur occasio, si multo difficilius est occasionem dimittere, quam adhibitis remediis peccatum vitare ".[34]

2. When the circumstances are such that fraternal cohabitation is *not permissible,* the parties have a grave obligation to separate.

a) Accordingly, if they *refuse* to separate, they are unworthy of absolution by reason of their unwillingness to fulfil a grave obligation and on account of their unjustified remaining in an occasion of sin or of scandal or of both.

b) If, however, they promise to separate, may they be absolved before they have actually carried out their promise? At first sight, one might contend that in this case, even though the penitent has all the requisite dispositions, prudence will demand the deferring of absolution, just as it would in the matter of dismissing a concubine.

But, even if the parties have for a time continued conjugal relations after learning of the nullity of their marriage, although morally there is no difference between the pseudo-wife and a concubine, in other respects the difference is often very great. Even when there are no extrinsic obstacles in the matter of financial settlements, an invalid marriage is not as easy to break up as a state of concubinage. Scandal is stopped by dismissing a concubine at once; but scandal as well as legal complications will often result from such a dismissal of a pseudo-wife. If the reason for the nullity cannot be published, because it is a defaming impediment, scandal may be caused by what the people will take for expulsion or desertion. Moreover, the legal formalities of an ecclesiastical annulment and a civil divorce take time, and the civil law or the circumstances may demand cohabitation in the meantime.

Consequently, between the cohabitation which is a voluntary occasion of sin and that which is a necessary occasion, there is a third kind which is temporarily necessary, while taking the steps to dissolve the cohabitation, and which will become volun-

[34] *Op. cit.*, III, 400; or in Noldin-Schmitt, III, 401.

tary only if continued permanently or longer than necessary. Thus Gasparri, in the passage above quoted, says that while the revalidation or the declaration of nullity is pending, the parties should be separated, " nisi cohabitationis separatio sit moraliter impossibilis et suppetant media, quibus sufficienter occuratur scandalo et incontinentiae periculo ". Whenever, therefore, such " media " are available and the penitent seriously intends to do his best to bring about the separation as soon as possible, there seems to be no reason why absolution would have to be deferred.

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## HOLY WRIT IN THE LITURGY.

THE BIBLE and the liturgy are precious nuptial gifts of God to His Church. They are two sources of divine life, two sensible expressions of the Incarnate Word. The liturgy is indispensable, for it is the vitalizing artery of the mystical body of Christ. The Church could exist, and, indeed has existed without the Scriptures, as in the first century before the Epistles and Gospels had been written; but she could not exist without the liturgy, the bearer of her sacramental and sacred life. Modern research confirms this statement: the sacramental words used in the consecration at Mass are influenced in their wording by the primitive liturgy.[1] Again, the Cantica in Luke's Gospel, the Gloria of the angels, the Magnificat of the Blessed Virgin, the Benedictus of Zachary and the Nunc dimittis of the aged Simeon were all probably sung in the liturgy of Jerusalem even before the writing of St. Luke's Gospel.[2]

To be sure, the Church depends upon the divine revelation of which Holy Scripture, as the inspired word of God, forms a very noble part, but not the indispensable part. The ultimate foundation of all ecclesiastical doctrine is oral tradition, the heart of which is the liturgy.

The liturgy is therefore an element of life which entrusts a definite, special function to Holy Scripture in so far as it enters into the liturgical organism. The liturgy is the *cult-mysterium* in which God's work of Redemption in Christ becomes sacramentally present for us in order that we may live with it intimately and vitally, and thus become members of Christ. Hence the abiding revelation of God as our Saviour takes place in the liturgy.

The word of Holy Scripture is a discourse of God with us. In Scripture He reveals Himself to us, setting forth in human language His eternal thoughts of salvation. These thoughts are set forth in writing so that we may find God Himself in the word.

[1] Fritz Hamm, Die liturgischen Einsetzungsberichte im Sinne vergleichender Liturgieforschung untersucht. *Liturgiegesch. Quellen und Forschungen,* XXIII, Muenster in Westphalia, 1928, p. 2.

[2] Hugo Bévenot, Alte und Neue Lukanische Quellen. *Theolog. Quartalschrift,* 110 Tublingen, 1929, p. 444.

Therefore the connexion between liturgy and Holy Scripture is dependent upon the relationship between *mysterium* and *Logos*. In both, God's will of Redemption is present and active: in the liturgy through holy action which is explained and enhanced by the words, in Holy Scripture by the words alone.

The mysteries of cult and the word of the Scriptures are entrusted not to the individual, but to the Church. Only from the hands of the Church do we receive both Sacrament and Holy Writ with its correct, legitimate interpretation.

Paschasius Radbertus said of the close connexion between the *mysterium* and the written word: " The Incarnation of God is rightly termed a mysterium or sacrament . . . But there is also a sacrament in the Scriptures, where the Holy Ghost acts interiorly through efficacious words (efficaciter loquendo operatur)".[3]

Here therefore the first mysterium of the Redemption which is mystically committed to cult, and the mysterium of the word of Scripture are related to each other. Because it deals with mysteries, the liturgy is essentially linked to symbols, and consequently, in so far as it is word, it requires the symbolic word.

Holy Scripture, as the word of God formed by the Holy Ghost, also possesses a symbolic character, for it expresses superhuman, divine truths in human language. Thus it becomes a symbol that alludes and at the same time fulfils. Because of this the word content of the liturgy is for the most part the word of Scripture, which, however, is used only as a constituent element of the cultual action. It is of an inspired, dramatic character, it enters with the mysterium into our personal, present time, and becomes a definite revelation in the scene. The "dicit Dominus" of the Old Testament becomes a living word of God in the present; the "dixit Jesus discipulis" introduces immediately to us the instructive word of Christ. Here the historical is divorced from the past and through its participation in the *cult-mysterium* of the present becomes an eternal value shining forth at the present moment.

The word content of the liturgy consists chiefly of selections from Holy Writ, and may be classified either as lessons (Lectio) or prayer. The lessons, which occupy a prominent part of the

[3] Migne, P. L., 120, 1275 f.

liturgy, may be divided into two sections: the lessons of the Mass, and the lessons in the "Officium Divinum", the Breviary.

Since the lessons of the Breviary cover a very wide range, it may be better to proceed with those of the Mass of the Catechumens, thereby beginning with the more familiar.

It is characteristic of the liturgy that it assimilates into its own vital organism every text of Scripture that it uses. Its vital principle is the economy of salvation in Christ and the Church; that is, the achievement of the Redemption which Christ is continually effecting with and through His Church. And so the liturgy inserts the word of Scripture into our present time, for example, it says in the Epistle of the first Monday in Lent: "As the shepherd visiteth his flock in the day when he shall be in the midst of his sheep that were scattered, so shall I visit my sheep, and deliver them out of all the places where they have been scattered in the cloudy and dark day." Christ calls His little sheep scattered in the darkness of heathendom, who on this day are enrolled by name in the list of the catechumens, in order that He may lead them into the freedom of the children of God. He also summons us to-day out of our darkness and dispersion: "I shall seek that which was lost, and that which was driven away I shall bring again; and I shall bind up that which was broken, and strengthen that which was weak, and that which was fast and strong I shall preserve." In each case the time is the present.

The Gospel of the same day shows the King who, separating the sheep from the goats, calls those blessed of His Father into His Kingdom and casts the damned into everlasting fire. This separation of the spirits which begins on the day of admission into the catechumenate and will be completed at the Last Judgment, is here established in the present time of the eucharistic Christ expected in the Consecration, and thus it is an actuality for the congregation participating in the celebration.

In the gospel of the Good Samaritan the same economy of salvation is shown. Priest and levite (Old Testament) cannot help the wounded man, but the Samaritan (Christ) lifts up the sorely afflicted one. He bears Him to the inn (the Church) and there commands: "Take care of him: and whatsoever thou shalt spend over the above, I at my return will repay thee."

This "cum rediero" signifies the Parousia, when Christ will appear a second time in order to grant the eternal reward.

In this way every lesson in the Mass of the Catechumens is lifted out of its isolation as an individual text and is orientated toward the great dogmatic association—Christ and the Church. This unifying tendency is further enhanced by the insertion of the lessons in the rhythmical flow of the time of the church year.

The church year unites with the natural year and links Christ's work of Redemption to the corresponding time of the year. As the sun regulates and determines the course of the natural year, so the Church places the mysteries of Redemption in the mystical year. Christ is its sun which, rising brilliantly at Christmas, reaches its high noon at Easter and from Pentecost on brings the seed to maturity. The lessons from the Gospel and the corresponding Epistles are distributed over these feasts and festal seasons. They bestow a festive character upon the day and make present the mystery of Redemption of which they speak. Thus Leo the Great says of the feast of the Passion of Christ: "We must always celebrate with all honor in our hearts this highest and most powerful mystery of the divine mercy: but now this requires a still more vital understanding of the spirit, and a purer eye of the soul, since the whole work of our Redemption is brought before us, not only through the reöccurrence of the point of time but also through the text of the Gospel lesson." [4]

The time motive receives much less emphasis in the missal than in the breviary. However, in the missal, the *Statio,* the place where the mysteries are celebrated, appears, and is very often in the foreground. It helps to lend perspective and plasticity to one's view of the biblical actuality, and at the same time it lends spaciousness and depth to the word of Scripture.

The two foremost churches of the Eternal City are St. John Lateran and St. Peter's. The Lateran basilica, mother of all the churches of the world, was the particular cathedral of the Roman community. Here were held the inauguration of the Lenten season and the Paschal baptism ceremony. The basilica of St. Peter was the church of the foreigners, the travellers who came on pilgrimage to the tomb of the Prince of the Apostles. Here were held those ceremonies which expressed the world-

[4] Migne, P. L. 54,508 D., cf. Jahrbuch f. Liturgiewissenschaft, 8, Muenster, 1929, p. 208 ff.

embracing, universal character of the Roman Church, e.g., Epiphany, and before this, the Day Mass of Christmas. That is why on these two feasts the Introits, as well as all the lessons and chants, are nothing but a proclamation of the world-embracing kingdom of Christ and of His royal majesty. Here may be cited some texts which explain themselves in their own words. "A child is born to us, and a son is given to us: whose empire rests upon His shoulders," from the Introit for Third Mass of Christmas. "The Son, who being the brightness of the glory of the Father, and the figure of His substance, and upholding all things by the word of His power, making purgation of sins, sitteth on the right hand of the majesty on high . . . But to the Son He saith: " Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever; a sceptre of justice is the sceptre of Thy kingdom." (Epistle.) " All the ends of the earth have seen the salvation of our God: sing joyfully to God all the earth! The Lord hath made known His salvation in the sight of the Gentiles." (Gradual) "Behold," says the Introit for the Feast of the Epiphany, in St. Peter's, "the Lord, the Ruler is come: and the Kingdom is in His hand, and power, and dominion. Give to the King Thy judgment, O God; and to the King's Son Thy justice." "Arise," begins the Epistle, "be enlightened, O Jerusalem, for thy Light is come and the glory of the Lord is risen upon thee." The Gospel tells of the new-born King of the Jews, who is adored in the Offertory by the kings of Tharsis and to whom gifts are brought by the Kings of Arabia and Saba: " And all kings of the earth shall adore Him; all nations shall serve Him." Both Masses are filled with scriptural words of the kingship of Christ.

The influence of the same *Statio* (ad S. Petrum) manifests itself in a different way on Easter Monday where the congregation is personified as " Peter," when during the Communion antiphon the liturgy sings: "The Lord is risen and hath appeared to Peter." Here Peter becomes the congregation in St. Peter's, and indeed, the whole Church.

The scriptural lessons of the Mass of the Catechumens display their special connexion with the mysterium especially through the parallelism between the lessons of the Old Testament and the New; a parallelism that is often obvious, often discernible only as a hidden agreement. Here we have a living illustra-

tion of the words of St. Augustine: "The New Testament lurks in the Old; the Old is revealed in the New."[5]

By placing in juxtaposition Moses, who strikes the rock and thereby causes the water to gush forth (Epistle), and the Samaritan woman at the well of Jacob (Gospel), the relationship is clear. (Friday after Third Sunday of Lent.) Each scene is a type of the water of Baptism, of the eucharistic drink and of the life-stream of grace which delivers men from death and leads them to eternal life.

At other times it is necessary to search for the relation. On Monday after the fourth Sunday of Lent, for example, the Epistle treats of Solomon's judgment of two contending women, whereby he recognized as mother the woman eager to save the life of the child. " And all Israel heard the judgment which the king had judged, and they feared the king, seeing that the wisdom of God was in him to do judgment." The Gospel of the same day deals with the purging of the Temple and the prophecy of the Resurrection of the Lord: "But He spoke of the temple of His body." The subject matter of the Gospel displays no possible connexion with that of the Epistle. Not until the last word does the hidden relationship disclose itself: "But Jesus did not trust Himself unto them, for He knew all men, and because He needed not that any should give testimony of man: for He knew what was in man."

This is therefore the typical representation of Solomon. If all Israel was amazed at what was, after all, only a human, psychological knowledge, how much greater than Solomon is Christ who essentially possesses all science and wisdom!

This art of interpreting the liturgy through the parallelism of the Old and New Testament is one of the most important methods of the living exhibition of Holy Writ, and finds its mystical application in the pictures in the Catacombs.[6]

A concept of paramount importance in determining the selection of Gospel lessons is the expectation of the parousia, the second coming of the Lord. Straightway after Pentecost this second coming in judgment is announced, and it stands out continually more and more in relief as the year advances, until finally the profoundly stirring prophetical picture of the Last

[5] (S Aug.) Quaest. in Hept., lib. II, quaest. 73, Migne, P. L. 34,623.

[6] Ildefons Herwegen, *Christliche Kunst und Mysterium*, Muenster, 1929, p. 14 ff.

Judgment concludes the church year. This thought of the parousia is actually the dominant motif of those feasts of the saints which lack their own proper Mass formulary. We celebrate the death of the saints which meant for them, and through them means for us, a parousia of Christ. "For the Son of Man shall come in the glory of His Father with His angels; and then will He render to every man according to his works" (Common of a Holy Martyr). "And he that had received the five talents, coming, brought other five talents; saying: 'Lord, thou didst deliver to me five talents; behold I have gained other five over and above'. His Lord said to him: 'Well done, good and faithful servant; because thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will place thee over many things: enter thou into the joy of the Lord' " (Common of a Holy Bishop). "Blessed are those servants whom the Lord, when he cometh, finds watching . . . and if he shall come in the second watch, or in the third watch, and find them so, blessed are those servants . . . Be you then also ready, for at what hour you think not, the Son of Man will come" (Common of a Holy Confessor). "Amen, I say to you that you, who have followed Me in the regeneration when the Son of Man shall sit on the seat of His majesty, you also shall sit on twelve seats, judging the twelve tribes of Israel" (Common of a Holy Abbot). "And at midnight there was a cry made: Behold the bridegroom cometh; go ye forth to meet him . . . Watch ye, therefore, because you know not the day nor the hour" (Common of a Holy Virgin). "So shall it be at the end of the world: the angels shall go out, and shall separate the wicked from among the just, and shall cast them into the furnace of fire: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth" (Common of a Holy Woman).

This glimpse of the Last Judgment, here so strongly emphasized, as a manifestation of Christ among us, parousia, is in fact the basic idea of the lesson from the Gospel in the Mass of the Catechumens. The gospel book, as a symbol of Christ, accompanied by burning lights and incense, indicates the climax of the Mass of the Catechumens. The highest attendant of the priest, the deacon, does the reading. The word of the Gospel is the word of Christ, who stands spiritually in our midst. Here the parousia of the Logos, the Word, precedes the eucharistic parousia of the sacrificial celebration soon to follow. From this

relationship results indispensably the inclusion of the lessons within the scope of the mysterium and thereby the establishment among us in the present of Christ's work of Redemption.

The lessons of the first part of the Mass were originally and still remain instruction, but instruction in one way for the catechumens, and in another for the baptized. This first part of the Mass is known as the Mass of the Catechumens. Those who as yet were not baptized were allowed to be present, in order to acquaint themselves with the Christian truths by listening to the lessons. The baptized, however, those to whom the mysterium had already been revealed, drew a new meaning from these same lessons, for they beheld the connexion of the word with the eucharistic Christ. Applicable to them was the word of Christ to the Apostles: "To you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of God, but to them that are without all things are done in parables." What is a presentiment of faith for the latter is the reality of faith for the former.

The lessons of the breviary represent an amplification of the lessons of the Mass of the Catechumens. This is particularly true of the lessons in the night office, the vigils, and then, as a remembrance of these, the Capitula of the separate hours of prayer of the day's divisions.

The vigils, originally the first part of the Mass, were celebrated in the night, and were followed by the eucharistic sacrifice in the early morning. The first principle of these lessons of the breviary is the Lectio continua, the continuous reading of Holy Writ. The distribution of the books of the Bible over determined times proceeds from a second formative principle, that of the time.

In preparatory periods of time the Old Testament was favored; in festive times, the New. Thus Advent, as the preparation for the coming of Christ derives its lessons from the prophet Isaias. Christmastide uses the Pauline Epistles. In Lent, from Septuagesima to Passion Sunday, the Books of Moses are read, beginning with Genesis. Throughout Passiontide the prophet Jeremias is heard. The entire paschal season, a festive time, is again devoted to the New Testament: the Acts of the Apostles, and the Epistles of the Apostles. After Pentecost the lessons revert to the Old Testament, and beginning with the Books of Kings there is a description of the building up of the

kingdom of Christ according to the first sketch of the typifying kingdom in the Old Testament. With Ezechias, of whom the fourth Book of Kings says: "After him there was none like him among all the kings of Juda, nor any of them that were before him," the exterior edifice of the people of God reaches the perfection of its development, and beginning with the first Sunday of August, in the fulness of summertime when the harvest ripens, the reading turns to the interior formation of the Church through the utterances of the Sapiential Books. In September, when the decline of the year is already perceptible, are read the Books of suffering and strife: Job, Judith, and Esther. In October is related the heroic struggle of the Macchabees for the kingdom of God, together with their victorious triumph in the midst of external destruction. November, with its impression of winter darkness, leads us by the hands of the prophets Ezechiel, Daniel and the Minor Prophets—analogous to the proclaiming of the parousia in the Gospels at this time—to meet the end of the world and the approaching judgment of God.

Consequently the Divine Office of the breviary is in principle a reading through of all the Bible, arranged according to definite partitions of the natural and the liturgical year and suggesting an abundance of motives for interpretation. It is precisely through the grouping of the individual books of the Bible, the historical, prophetical and sapiential, according to a determined part of the church year, that the scriptural lessons of the breviary are at all times in intimate contact with the eucharistic sacrifice and participate in its mystical character. Holy Writ in this way is displayed as something living in our present time, and not a mere remembrance of the past.

It should also be noted that the scriptural lessons of the breviary receive a broad exposition through the lessons from the Fathers, and that these Patristic texts which are for the most part homilies, sermons, were delivered by the Fathers of the Church during divine services. The connexion of the scriptural lessons with the performance of divine services is therefore constantly maintained in the breviary.

Every liturgcial celebration is essentially prayer. In the liturgy, even the doctrinal and admonitory lessons are converted into sources of prayer. The transition from lesson to prayer becomes clear in the Responsories, the alternating chants which

follow the lessons. The Responsories are the echo of the lesson in the souls of the faithful and are at the same time the lyrical phrasings of the text of the doctrinal lesson. That is why they employ a musically rich melody instead of the simple monotone of the lesson.

The teacher reads, the mystic prays. Often the text of the responsory repeats word for word a portion of the lesson. The selfsame word now sounds again, no longer as doctrine but as prayer, as the prayerful product of the lesson.

Through the lesson the Holy Ghost has opened the soul of the man. Now the man converses with God, and God answers him. This prayerful intercourse with God occurs in the liturgy in the richest measure during the chanting of the psalms.

As inspired prayers the psalms are of divine origin and hence possess their own unrivalled inspiration. Even the human element in them attains an unsurpassable depth of emotion and a rare beauty of expression. Adoration, praise, supplication, have found a pattern for all time in these songs of Holy Scripture. The Psalter has become the Church's prayerbook. In these prayers she speaks to God, even as she speaks to us in the lessons. As her members, in and with Christ, we pray the psalms. Her Jubilate and Laudate psalms are Eucharistia—acts of thanksgiving. The historical psalms typify the leading of the Church through the world; the psalms of struggle and suffering are the prayers of the Church of the martyrs. The liturgy allots songs of psalmody for the night in order to mark the struggle of the light with the darkness, and for the early morning in order to mark the resurrection of the light which is Christ. In the day hours we sing the songs of the wayfarers, songs which first resounded along the pilgrim ways leading to Jerusalem at the times of the great feasts. Just as Christ Himself on His wandering travels, at the Last Supper, and even on the tree of the Cross prayed the psalms, so does the Church in her liturgy at the eucharistic celebration of the Lord's Supper, amidst the joys and sorrows of the church year and of the world.

Liturgy is worship of God. But it would be a grave error to believe that because of this it is excluded from external life. Anyone familiar with it knows that it penetrates all of life, that it, as it were, embraces the vital functions of the faithful in order to lift them up out of the earthly and to elevate them

into the sphere of the divine. Along with the life stream which, proceeding from the liturgy, enters into all human provinces, the word of God of Holy Writ gains admittance into every sphere of life. It is precisely through the liturgy that the Holy Scripture becomes the book of life for the Christian. Unquestionably God's word is in itself life. In Baptism our ear for the word of God is opened: "Ephphetha: be thou opened!" Thereby we became capable of receiving the life hidden in the word. Through its immediate union with the mysterium of Christ present in the Church and in the Holy Eucharist, the divine word remains for us a permanent grace, and hence a bearer of life.

Only Christ in the liturgy makes us worthy to open the book of Holy Scripture: "Dignus est Agnus aperire librum. Only Christ as the eucharistic lamb of sacrifice discloses to us the deepest meaning of the Scriptures. We must become lambs of sacrifice in the mysterium, so that "His word becomes a lamp to our feet and a light to our paths" (Psalm 118:105).

Every listening to Holy Scripture in the liturgy is a meeting with God, with the Logos, a touch of the Holy Ghost. The soul then should be a complete church, a listening, adoring, sacrificing church.

The liturgy is a definite, grandiose arrangement, the only efficacious one for a vital experiencing of Holy Writ, and for rendering its content fluid and fruitful. It shows us and gives us the Bible immediately from within. It places us, so to say, in its center of origin; it immerses us in the source of inspiration, so that we no longer approach the Scriptures from without with our individual, personal dispositions, as does the reader not of the Faith, but we draw near to it in an immediate union of life with its Divine Inspirer. Thus we are able to understand the deeper, latent meanings and references, and even to receive their efficacy in us. Ambrose says, a special virtue flows from the reading of the Gospel in the liturgy.[7]

The liturgy allows us to experience daily, in great fulness, all the mysteries of Redemption simultaneously.

Very few out of many meanings have been set forth in these pages. But everyone who with missal in hand participates in

[7] "Evangelium legitur, virtus exit de sermone coelesti." S. Ambrosius, De Noe et arca. XIX, 70, Migne, P. L., 14,395.

the Mass, and who familiarizes himself with the breviary, will obtain a fuller view of the unsuspected wealth of Holy Scripture.

The Fathers are filled with such deep reverence for the words, the types and symbols of the Bible, even for those of the Old Testament, and at the same time have such an intimate familiarity with them, because they lived through the mysterium. Here the whole interior and exterior man lie open to the illumination proceeding from the divine word. If anyone assumes the divine light into himself and then lives through it, his behavior cannot but be an expression of divine grace.

Holy Writ is not only a document of revelation but also the book of divine grace. It shows us how the trinitarian life of God rising from the Father, and still more powerfully in the Incarnation of the Son, in its consummate fulness through the Holy Ghost, takes possession of mankind. This process of salvation must repeat itself in every one of the elect. Established and controlled by the liturgy, the genesis, development and consummation of the *homo Christianus* is a living compendium of the Scriptures.*

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# Studies and Conferences

**Questions, the discussion of which is for the information of the general reader of the Department of Studies and Conferences, are answered in the order in which they reach us. The Editor cannot engage to reply to inquiries by private letter.**

## WILL THINGS EVER BE RIGHT?

Many years ago the late Mr. Chesterton wrote a book entitled *What is Wrong with the World*. Needless to say, he answered the question to his own satisfaction, suggested a few epigrammatic remedies, and, having conferred this benefit on society, went on to write a number of other books. I do not know whether or not the world then and there tried the Chesterton prescription, but I do know that this diagnosing and prescribing for the ills of mother earth has been going on from time immemorial, that it is likely to continue indefinitely, and that, notwithstanding all, mother earth is not yet, and probably never will be pronounced out of danger. If you read through the literature of to-day, or if you search back through the records of history, you will find the same old diagnosing, the same old prescribing, and the same old bulletin being periodically sent out from the sick-chamber: "The patient is still in a serious condition, but under the present distinguished staff of specialists there is every hope of a speedy and permanent recovery."

Indeed one of the strange things about this human world of ours is its ability to continue from time immemorial "in a critical condition." In fact there is no record of any age in which it was otherwise. And another of the strange things is the number and variety of the panaceas and world-cures that have been so loudly advertised, so confidently tried, and so invariably discarded as either altogether useless or actually harmful. The ballot-box, education, woman suffrage, Christian Science, Prohibition—all have been advocated with enthusiasm and with a confident "no-cure-no-pay" label, each as soon as tried to be succeeded by the other; and here we are well into the twentieth century still analyzing, still prescribing, and still proclaiming that the true remedy has been found at last, and

that to cure all the ills that flesh is heir to, the only thing the human race has to do is to step forward and take a dose of the new prescription.

The latest brand on the market is known as Communism. It has been officially prescribed and is being officially administered in Russia; but it has its sales-agents drumming up customers in all parts of the world. However, only a few trusted visitors are allowed into the sick-chamber where the distinguished patient is being used as a guinea-pig to try out the new concoction. The bulletins sent out from the operating-room are all issued under the strict supervision and censorship of those who are conducting the experiment; and any deviation from the authorized report is punished either by death or by exile to the Siberian mines.

To realize how many and what a variety of these patent-medicines are being tried on the unsuspecting public all you have to do is to keep in touch with the lectures delivered or the papers read before Chambers of Commerce, Rotarians, Lions, Luncheon Clubs, and all the other clubs for the abolition of crime and poverty, and for the elimination of the defects and imperfections of the human race. The distinguished lecturer usually begins with the very same but obvious point that there is something wrong with society. The second point of the distinguished lecturer is that the remedies hitherto employed have been based on a complete misunderstanding of the problems. Then the third point is reached, which is—here the lecturer takes a sip of water and assumes a tone appropriate to the importance of the revelation—that the social problem will never be solved until—. At this point the audience is let into the secrets of the new remedy. A committee is now formed to carry out the lecturer's proposal, subscriptions to the good work are solicited and the distinguished lecturer has to leave that afternoon by airplane to Washington where he is to unfold his plan before a federal bureau through which he hopes to get an appropriation of a few million dollars just to cover the necessary overhead expenses of making the world what it would have been except for original sin. Now, the diagnosis, the criticisms, and the suggestions of the distinguished lecturer may be perfectly correct. The only trouble is that we have heard and tried thousands of them already, and that there are so

many more of them let off on the public every night that we have become pessimistic about the value of any of them and end by ignoring all of them.

To come back to Mr. Chesterton's question, " What is wrong with the World? " one may ask, " What is, or what was wrong with Mr. Chesterton? " Let me put it in this way: If you go into a great medical building in one of our large cities, and look at the plates on the doors, you will notice the names of doctors and surgeons and health specialists, each specializing on some one or other of the bodily ills of humanity. Enter the office of one of these doctors and ask him what is wrong with the human system or why so many doctors, surgeons and specialists? If the doctor is a very busy man, or very serious, he will probably conclude that there must be something wrong with yourself and turn you over to the brain specialist next door. But if he is not very busy, and if he is good-humored, he will explain to you that this city contains not merely one human system but about half a million of them; that each human system is different from every other, and is a most marvellously complicated structure with countless organs and nerves and veins and most wonderfully fashioned; that each part is subject to a variety of ills and accidents and diseases, affecting not only itself but reacting on the whole system; that it is these ills and accidents that keep all the doctors, surgeons and specialists busy diagnosing and prescribing; and that as long as the human body remains as it is, so long will there be doctors, surgeons and specialists, and still there will be plenty of things wrong with this complex body of ours. He will probably end by telling you that the only way to solve the health problem would be to put an end to those that created the problem—namely, the doctor himself and you and me and the rest of us.

Now the social system is just as complicated as the bodily system. It consists of about two billion human beings. If all these human beings were like a crop of onions or peas—grown from a uniform seed, set in a uniform soil, cultivated and treated in a uniform manner, then just as you might ask, " What's wrong with the onions or the peas? " so you might also ask, " What's wrong with the world? " But the fact is that the human race is the most diversified thing in existence.

It has thousands of different nations and tribes and tongues, envying one another, hating one another, fighting one another. It has all degrees of rank and wealth and power, from the outcast pariahs of India to the money kings that control the banks and mines and railroads. It has all kinds of children, good and bad and very bad; all kinds of husbands and wives, fathers and sons, masters and workmen. Each one of these classes and grades, even each individual thereof, has his own troubles, difficulties and problems; and the sum of all these troubles, difficulties and problems is what makes up all the social problem. So when a man asks, " What is Wrong with the World "? or " Why don't we solve the Social Problem? " the reason is that there is something wrong with himself, or he wants a fantastic title for a book or a magazine article or a lecture. It is just as impossible to prescribe a universal remedy for all the ills that the body social is subject to, as to provide a universal remedy for all the ills that the body physical is subject to.

Indeed it is a tactical mistake to speak of solving the social problem, or even to give the impression that is can be done; for, as I said, the social problem is the sum of all the problems of everybody; and the moment you establish a free social problem clinic you will find that on the following morning the whole human race will be waiting in line for the necessary free prescription and free medicine. Some of these applicants have only imaginary ailments; some of them could pay for their own remedies; some of them are incurable; and the rest simply fall in line on the general principle that as everybody is paying both for the clinic and the medicine, so everybody might as well " horn in and get something while the getting is good ". The easiest way to find out this is to put a sign on your lawn announcing " free eats " for every hungry man that passes by. In a short time there will be so many applicants that the restaurants will have to go out of business, and you yourself also. Or, let all the owners of automobiles get together and make the charitable resolution that they will never refuse a ride on the highway to anyone who lifts his thumb by way of appeal. Very soon the railways and the bus-lines would be bankrupt, automobile sales would fall to zero and we would all be " thumbing " our way to the football games.

The country is littered with agencies, bureaus, departments and societies, all ladling out remedies, relief and monthly allowances; and all calling out for still further appropriations to continue their activities, all of which appropriations must come either from charity or taxation. The natural consequence is that taxation has grown beyond human endurance, and charity is growing cold because it sees such poor results from previous benefactions. We have indeed countless problems to solve, but the most recent and the most serious is the number and variety and expense of the previous solutions and those who administer them.

The fact that the Alberta Plan in Canada and the Townsend Plan in this country were and are taken so seriously is a dangerous symptom of the state of mind to which society has come. The great problem now is to balance budgets, and to fill the community chest; and from both has gone up the cry, "We must retrench, and curtail expenses or we are ruined." However, when it comes to curtailing or abolishing bureaus or appropriations, nobody wants to say what bureau to abolish or what appropriation to curtail, and so we end by leaving things just as they are. We started out with the idea that the social problem was only one devil. Now we have discovered that his name is legion, and that as soon as we cast out one by the front door seven more have entered in by the back door and the last state of society is worse than the first.

All this comes from forgetting the source of the evil and our limited power of providing an adequate remedy. The source of the evil is human nature, or rather human nature as vitiated by original sin; and our limited power of remedying the evil is a limitation placed by God Himself. The body physical has the power of curing the minor ills and accidents that come to us during our earthly journey. But if we lose a leg or an arm or an eye, nature has not given us the power to renew them. It is the same with the body social: many of its defects or diseases can be cured by our own efforts; but there are some that cannot be cured at all, or only by the help of outside agencies. It is then that another principle comes in—namely, that we must endure what we cannot cure.

This is a religious principle. It was enunciated by God Himself after the fall of our first parents: "Cursed is the earth in

thy work; with labor and toil shalt thou eat thereof all the days of thy life. Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee and thou shalt eat the herbs of the earth. In the sweat of thy face thou shalt eat bread till thou return to the dust out of which thou wast taken: for dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return." Holy Job said, "Man's life is a warfare," and a famous American general said, "War is hell." So, too, said our Divine Lord, the greatest of all social workers: "The poor you have always with you;" again: "It must needs be that scandals come." In other words our Lord said that we will always have poverty in the world; and we will have sin always; and these two are the principal roads of the social evil, in fact of all evils. Consequently, in answer to the question placed at the head of this essay I have divine authority for saying, "Things never will be right." We can never solve the Social Problem. Whoever says he *can* solve it, is running counter to two divine prophecies: one uttered after the fall of our first parents, and the other by Him who came to redeem us.

This however does not mean that we should do nothing toward mitigating the evils around us. Rather it means that the human race will, no matter how long it takes, always have an opportunity of coöperating in the work of Jesus Christ. It means that there will always be afflicted bodies on which we can exercise the corporal works of mercy, and afflicted souls on which we can exercise the spiritual works of mercy; and that whatever we do, be it ever so small, will not pass without its reward. And so, perhaps, one reason why God allowed this world to come to its present condition, and to continue therein, is to provide an opportunity for us to merit a place in a world where there will be no social problem, and where things will be always right.

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## MASS STIPENDS.

In considering the many opinions on the topic of Mass stipends one is somewhat bewildered. The practice of receiving stipends is very old and does not seem to be disappearing. Priests and people find nothing astounding in it and the venal side of the practice does not appear to the priest except perhaps

when he is filing his income-tax return. A thing of the past, a practice of the present, how do we justify these stipends?

If one should be tempted to pronounce the subject as trite and settled ages ago, one should read a monograph on the subject and then, ponder.[1] Amongst the more recent explanations we have found one that might be of interest to everybody: it seems clear, precise and adequate.

In moral theology the subject of Mass stipends occupies a place in the chapter on simony. This crime of simony is of divine as well as ecclesiastical law. If anyone sells or intends to sell or buy for a temporal price things spiritual, or a temporal object adnexed to the spiritual in such a way that the temporal cannot exist without the spiritual, he commits the sin and possibly the crime of simony as determined by divine law. If anyone should give temporal things adnexed to spiritual objects for other temporal things adnexed to spiritual objects, or spiritual objects for spiritual objects, or temporal for temporal objects in cases in which this is forbidden by the Church for the sake of reverence to sacred things, he commits the sin and possibly the crime of simony as determined by ecclesiastical law.[2]

It is easily proved that the accepting of Mass stipends is not simony in the sense determined by ecclesiastical law, since the conditions of canon 727 are in no way fulfilled.

Surely there is no simony as defined by divine law since canon law approves of the long-standing practice of accepting Mass stipends and the Code would not have approved anything contrary to divine law.[3] Such a judgment in the case of Mass stipends seems to be *a priori*. Why is it not simony to accept Mass stipends? Is not a Mass contracted for? In return for the money, must not a Mass be offered? and this, *sub gravi?* If we look at these questions superficially we would be guilty of offending against the letter of canon 727 § 1.

Theologians and canonists have tried in various ways to find a satisfactory explanation of the difficulty. All are sure that

[1] Keller: *Mass Stipends*, St. Louis, 1926.
[2] *Codex Juris Canonici*, cc. 727 n. 1-2.
[3] Codex J. C., c. 824.

there is no simony in the contract for a Mass; but, what is exchanged in the contract? The answers are most interesting.[4]

St. Thomas answers that the offering is not a price paid for the Mass but something given to the celebrant for his sustenance.[5]

De Lugo wrote profusely on the subject and held about the same opinion as St. Thomas, but insisted more upon the vital part that the stipend plays in the actual celebration of the Mass: the faithful wish this priest to say a Mass but the priest cannot do so unless he is living, clothed, etc., so that as preliminary condition, but not as a price for the Mass, is the stipend given and the Mass due. This opinion is correct yet not too satisfying because of the realistic trend.[6]

Layman was still more open to censure on the question. He insisted on the contractual nature of the Mass stipend and in order to find something to contract about, he unfortunately chose the element of time that the priest spends in the celebration of the Mass. It is only just that since the person wishes to have the priest devote so much time in his behalf that the time consumed should be paid for and not the Mass. This shocks us to-day because the time spent in celebrating the Mass is so intimately one with the spiritual, namely, the Mass, that we separate them with difficulty. Then too, canon 730 permits the accepting of temporalities on the occasion of spiritual ministrations provided we have a title recognized by law, and that there is no existing ecclesiastical prohibition of the act of acceptance. The title of time expended is hardly to be found amongst the titles recognized by the Church. Lastly, time and its value seem to be rather impractical as a basis of determining Mass stipends.[7]

Lehmkuhl held that the Mass stipend was given for the sustenance of the priest and in no way in compensation for the Mass.[8]

[4] Keller: cited, pp. 20 to 28; Vermeersch: *Theologia Moralis*, Romae, 1928, II, 246-251; Cappello: *De Sacramentis*, Romae, 1928, I, 533.

[5] St. Thomas: *Summa Theologica*: II, II, q. 100, art. 2 ad. 2.

[6] De Lugo: *De Eucharistia:* Disp. XXI, De Lugo: *Opera*, Parisiis, 1869, IV, 275. Gasparri: *Sanctissima Eucharistia*, Parisiis, 1897, 392.

[7] Layman: *Theologia Moralis*, Venetiis, 1719, bk. IV, t. X, c. 8 n. 41.

[8] Lehmkuhl: *Theologia Moralis*, Friburgii, 1898, II, 199.

The most original theory amongst the modern theories is that of De la Taille. The author, very much preoccupied with the desire to avoid and remove all taint of simony in connexion with Mass stipends, proposed an idealistic manner of conceiving them. He considers the stipend as offered to Almighty God. Just as the Jew of old used to offer a lamb in sacrifice, the Christian to-day offers the gift of the Mass stipend to God through the sacrifice of the Mass and God then returns it to the priest for his personal needs.[9] This opinion is indeed spiritual and mystic in its solution of the difficulty but, face to face with the stern, minute prescriptions of the *Codex*, it hardly offers an adequate explanation. The *jura stolae* could never be included in this solution; and it has other faults.

The pure juristic attitude on the Mass stipend is brought out by Del Guidice. He sees the stipend as a contract but not as a bilateral contract binding in strict justice. It does not bind because nobody can force the priest to render his part of the contract. Furthermore, the priest's activity as such is of no economic value. So there is no object for a contract. These are serious objections against the contractual form, but only in the event that one mistakes the real object of the contract and its peculiar interpretation, in the traditional doctrine of the Church.[10]

We would retain the contractual form and explain it in the sense that Vermeersch so aptly puts forth in his Moral Theology manual.[11] The substance of the theory differs little from the opinion of St. Thomas, but its dress and appearances bear a modern note. The Church is a living society. This society like all others has certain needs and the foremost amongst them is the necessity of a personnel dedicated to the propagation of the reign of Christ here on earth. The mission is indeed lofty and spiritual, but the wants of those to whom the mission has been confided are of a temporal nature. That personnel is made up of men: these men are the instruments of Christ, but they always remain men and need all that men need, at least as regards the basic necessities.

[9] De La Taille: *Mysterium Fidei*, Parisiis, 1921, 335-338.

[10] V. Del Guidice: *Stipendia Missarum*, Romae, 1922, 143.

[11] Vermeersch: cited, 248-251; cf. Suarez: *De Religione*, bk. IV, tr. 3. c. 21-46.

The Supreme Legislator in the Church realizes that and judges that He has the obligation of providing for all His priests. This we can deduce from the canons on the ordination of subjects to the priesthood and the serious reflexion demanded of bishops on that score.[12] Christ said that the laborer is worthy of his hire, and the Apostle proclaimed that they who labor for the altar should eat thereof.[13] The Church then has profited of spiritual ministrations in order to effect this great task of sustaining, providing for this vast personnel. One of the spiritual ministrations chosen for this purpose was the celebration of the Mass for particular intentions. The faithful have an obligation in justice to sustain and provide for those who care for them spiritually: this obligation comes from the divine law and from the natural law. One of the practical ways of fulfilling this obligation is simply to contribute to that sustenance of the clergy whenever a particular service is asked of them, and especially when the ineffable Sacrifice of the altar is offered by the priest in behalf of some particular and personal intention. In order to give a juridical tone to this act, the Church permits the faithful to enter into a contract, an innominate contract with the priest. In return for the contribution made to his sustenance the priest is held, and promises, to offer the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass for the special intention of the donor of the stipend. The donor offers the stipend not for the Mass, the priest receives the stipend not for the Mass, but both the donor and the recipient look upon the stipend as a stipend *sustentationis*. One agrees to give something for the sustenance of the other, whilst the recipient promises in return to do something for the donor. Note well that there is no exchange in which the Mass is involved.

How then can the obligation in justice to offer the Mass be explained from the part of the priest? This grave obligation cannot come from the nature of the contract, nor from the stipend.[14] This grave obligation comes from the express will of the legislator who in return for the collaboration of the faithful

[12] cc. 979 n. 2; 980; 969.

[13] cf. I Cor. 9:7; Matth. 10:10; Luc. 10:7.

[14] Vermeersch: cited, 250; *Theolog. Moralis*, III, 624; Cappello: cited, 540. Keller: cited, 22. Famous is the Decree *Nuper* of Innocent XII given Dec. 23, 1697 in which he holds under pain of mortal sin and restitution the stern doctrine that for every stipend accepted there must be said one Mass. Cf. Gasparri: cited, p. 420.

in providing for the personnel of the Church imposes the obligation of offering the Mass *sub gravi* as is the common and true opinion.[15] This explanation is simple and satisfying: the faithful are looked upon not as clients but rather as collaborators and coöperators with the supreme legislator in sustaining that great organization so vital to them and to Christ. Much more satisfying is this theory than the one which would deduce the gravity from the stipend: the ordinary stipend could never be grave matter in justice. Again, it responds better to reality than the opinion of those who ignore the contract as a contract and deduce the gravity of the obligation from the serious *damnum* inflicted upon the donor by reason of depriving him of the fruits of the Mass: what a roundabout way of figuring out an obligation! These same authors who hold this opinion when faced with the problem of restitution of the stipend for a Mass not celebrated, will generally incline to an obligation *sub levi* because the right of the donor was slightly violated! [16]

The foundation of Masses can be explained in the same way. In a foundation of this kind there is a contract, a bilateral contract. The contract is for the sustenance of priests or of a church over a given period, and in return the Church promises the celebration of Masses *sub gravi.* Even though the money is not given for the Masses, suppose that the Church fails to keep her promise, must she return the money? According to a well-founded opinion, she would not be held unless the will of the donor were specific on that point.[17] Otherwise it is presumed that the donor meant to donate the sustenance independently of the fulfilment of the obligation on the Church's part. Thus may be explained the power of the Church in the reduction and the condonation of legacies and Masses.

This explanation is canonical in its structure. The stipend in value certainly cannot be called the equivalent of a Mass: there is no proportion between the one and the other. In every country we would say that the stipend is determined on the basis of the cost of living. " By reason of the price of food and other necessities of life, the compensation of a private Mass to be

[15] Cappello: cited, 540-541. Keller: p. 90.
[16] Cappello: 542, Lehmkuhl, II, 197.
[17] Vermeersch-Creusen: *Epitome J. C.*, Brugis, 1934, II, 607.

celebrated is taxed at one half dollar." [18] Authors tell us that the stipend should represent one third to one half of the money necessary for a day's sustenance.[19] The stipend varies according to countries and the reason is the relation between it and the cost of living. The grave obligation attached even to the smallest and insignificant stipend (c. 828) can be explained only by the positive will of the Church and not by the contract. The reduction and condonation of masses appears very much simplified in this solution. *Jura stolae* play an honorable part in the rôle of the Church if explained according to this general theory.

But may the Church assume such liberty with the Sacraments? The Sacraments are no doubt the property (if we may thus speak) of Christ, but He has confided them to His Church: therefore it belongs to the Church to determine when and how they must be used and conferred. Did Christ intend that His ministers should not receive their sustenance from the altar? Evidently not, from His own words and those of the Apostle and from the tradition of the Church. Christ certainly would not have approved of any procedure wherein the sacraments or things spiritual were made the counterpart of venal contracts. In our case this is not present since the stipend is given for sustenance and not for the Mass. Thus there is no unwarranted liberty on the part of the Church. Mass stipends are licit because we have a legal title to them (canon 824), and they are licit because they are not given for spiritual things but on the occasion of spiritual ministrations (c. 730).

Many may be skeptical about our title of sustenance, since not a few could forgo mass stipends as far as sustenance is concerned. However if one would go down to the South or Southwest of our own country—and I am thinking now of those priests who are working amongst the Negro population—if one should go down there and ask those priests the source of their sustenance, the response would be: " Stipendia Missarum." The same is true of many European countries.

The Mass stipend is an offering to God because it is an offering to the priest who is entitled to use it for himself so that he in turn may extend the reign of God over souls. The individual

[18] *Concilia Provincialia Baltimorae:* n. 7 cited by Keller, p. 110.

[19] Cappello: p. 546; Gasparri: cited, 401; Keller, cited, III.

priest accepting the stipend in the name of the Church for his own sustenance is held by the will of the Church *sub gravi* to celebrate for the donor the desired Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. Mass stipends then are juridically and spiritually sound: if understood correctly, they are sacred, in the sense of separate from the profane.

WILLIAM F. ALLEN

*Rochester, New York.*

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## A PRODUCERS OR CONSUMERS ECONOMY?

To the Editor, THE ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW.

In his reply to my comments upon his article, " A Key to Social Justice? ", which appeared in the August issue of THE ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW, Father Ross argues, that the Pope does not oppose any change from a producers to a consumers economy, and reäffirms his belief that the latter would be consistent with the social encyclicals. My contention was that the Pope's program of social reconstruction calls for a rightly organized producers economy. The vocational groups or guilds which he recommends are essentially organizations of those who produce goods and give services. They are antithetic to consumers' coöperatives.

In my letter last month I admitted that a limited application of consumers' coöperatives is consistent with Catholic social teaching. In many instances they have been found to be excellent means of defense against capitalistic injustice. My objection to consumers' coöperatives is their general application to industry. I share the opinion of those who think that putting the whole of industry under a scheme of consumers' coöperatives would be to reduce all actual producers and distributors to a status of dependent wage-earners. The result would be to increase the ranks of the proletarians, the essence of whose condition, according to Professor Goetz' Briefs of Georgetown University, is their separation from ownership of the means of production. The aim of the social encyclicals, as Father Ross well knows, is precisely the " redemptio proletariorum ".

The socially bad effects of a wide-scale application of consumers' coöperatives are not a matter of conjecture. Dr. Franz Mueller, of St. Louis University, who at one time was enthusi-

astic about coöperatives, writes as follows in the April (1938) issue of *The Guildsman* (p. 5): "The social and economic consequences of the founding of consumers' coöperatives are practically the same as those of chain stores and department stores, in many European countries. They reduce the number of small independent tradesmen and increase the number of dependent, propertyless proletarians. In other words, instead of increasing the social element composed of owners of small or moderate property, they automatically tend to reduce it."

Father Ross asks that I clarify my statement that "under a coöperative commonwealth there would be less private ownership of productive property than there is under the existing system." I can do that best by quoting again from Dr. Mueller's article in *The Guildsman:* "Members of coöperatives and their employes remain essentially what they were, namely, proletarians, wage-earners, without real, actual, concrete property, without control over production, without sharing responsibility in industrial affairs" (p. 6).

Father Ross, I am sure, will agree that the essence of ownership is responsible control. There is precious little genuine and full ownership under the corporate form of productive property. I contend that there would be even less real effective ownership if all industry were under a scheme of consumers' coöperatives. Ownership in consumers' coöperatives would be more widely distributed than ownership of stock in the big corporations. But would it be effective ownership in the sense of responsible control? It has been noted that concentration of control in the hands of a few directors and executives increases in the proportion that ownership is widely dispersed. There is good reason, then, to argue that, if the coöperative enterprise is large and if it is run on the principle of one vote per member, that the influence of the individual shareholder will be practically negligible.

A producers economy rightly organized along vocational lines is the Pope's program for economic reconstruction. It is also the common-sense solution of our industrial ills. Witness this statement of Prof. L. T. Hobhouse: "Industry should not be organized by the consumer but by the producer. The producer is the man who knows his job. He is far more intimately and directly interested in the details of production than the con-

sumer, and he can be organized into a Guild with his fellows, which Guild will exercise a real and effective democratic control because all of its members will know what they are about and will have a living interest in the common decisions. Industrial self-government means the government of production by the organized body of producers." (*Elements of Social Justice*, p. 209-10.)

CARL P. HENSLER.

*Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.*

To the Editor, THE ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW.

The important thing still seems to me to be social justice. *If* a consumers economy can attain this, *and* a producers economy cannot, I do not believe the Pope would condemn a consumers economy because it organized consumers instead of producers. Should the men of St. Francis Xavier's University, Antigonish, succeed in making Nova Scotia a coöperative society, I cannot imagine the Pope writing: "I gave you my blessing when you were 10% coöperative, but now that you are 60% coöperative I withdraw the blessing."

Writing in a producers economy, the Pope naturally used language which in some of its phrases took for granted the continuance of such an economy. But it is going too far, I think, to conclude from this, that to reach his *end* of social justice in any other way is to be barred. Guilds in the Middle Ages were organizations of producers, but also they were organizations in an economy of hand production. It would be as legitimate, to my way of thinking, to assume that the Pope's use of this word implies that we should give up our system of mass production by power-driven machinery (a sort of "Erewhon" fantasy) as to assume that, *if* a consumers economy attaining social justice actually evolves Catholics should work to restore a producers economy. The Pope also used language implying an employer-employee relationship, but does that mean a society in which all were small owners working for themselves would be contrary to the encyclicals, because there would be no employers?

In the original article I had made one of the characters say: "We shall assume that the private ownership of small farms

by men who actually work them would be encouraged." That coöperatives can help the small farmer seems to be borne out by the figures in *Central Blatt and Social Justice* (July-August, 1938, p. 121), that fifty years ago in Denmark 5% of the farmers were owners and 95% tenants. To-day in Denmark 5% of the farmers are tenants and 95% are owners; whereas during the same period in the United States farm tenants have increased from 25% to 40%. "The explanation of this striking fact," remarks the *Central Blatt,* "is that Danish farmers have been better coöperators than those in the United States." If the aim of the social encyclical is precisely the "redemptio proletariorum," this seems to fit quite well with their purpose. Father Hensel seems to use the word "proletariat" in what the *Standard Dictionary* calls a Socialist sense, the wage-workers generally; but I prefer to make indigency, as in the earlier usage, the essence of proletarianism. Hence I do not consider part of the proletariat a mechanic making $2000 a year at an assured job, owning his own home and garden and car, with $10,000 in good bonds and $10,000 in paid-up life insurance.

The 95% owning farmers would have a coöperative to buy what they needed and a coöperative to bargain collectively for sale to consumers coöperatives for the sale of their products. Such a vocational group, I should think, could come under the Pope's term "guild". There would be room for several such farmers groups, embracing about 25% of the population. And there might be a medical vocational group, taking in physicians, nurses, those conducting hospitals. Probably the building trades could form another vocational group. And I can think of several others in a coöperative society.

We may rightly, I think, be said to live in an economy of mass production by power-driven machinery, although we still have some hand production. So we might have a coöperative society, sufficiently universal to attain social justice, and yet some small owners (besides farmers) producing with their own tools. Perhaps they could form another vocational group.

"The essence of ownership is responsible control." Before assenting to that I should have to know just how these terms are used. For instance, does a trustee and guardian of a minor have "responsible control" of the minor's property?

There is much more I should like to say, but I must be content with this: I have not been able to work out to my own satisfaction how to attain social justice in a producers economy, but I am groping toward such a result in a consumers economy. And since the end of production is consumption, it seems to me, in spite of the quoted opinion of Professor Hobhouse, that perhaps the common-sense thing is to make consumers the directors of industry.

J. Elliot Ross.

*Charlottesville, Virginia.*

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## THE MISSIONS AND ANTHROPOLOGY.*

It occurs to me that the work of a society or group of this kind is sometimes obstructed, not because of lack of interest on the part of the people, but by the peculiar circumstance of a word. This is particularly true, I think, of Americans. Americans dislike any word that seems to be pretentious, and with all due respect, I submit that the word "Anthropology" is widely pretentious to Americans, so much so that they fail to grasp the practical significance that such an undertaking as yours can have for the Church and for themselves.

What you can do for the name of the science itself and its supporting terminology, I don't know; but as a practical measure I beg leave to suggest that you do something about it.

There is a story of a bishop who remarked that he was very grateful to the Lord for not having conferred on modern missioners the gift of tongues. The bishop said that if modern missioners had the gift of tongues, they would wreck any mission in two months. I think this is a very shrewd remark and a very true one, because complementing the gift of tongues, one needs to have the gift of humanity, or the gift of Anthropology. A young mind and a facile tongue is a difficult, and may well be a disastrous, combination in a missioner.

The gift of humanity is more rare than the gift of tongues. There are many reasons for this. One reason, possibly, is, among us, that the tract "De homine" is theocentric rather than anthropo-centric. Why is it so? Historically, the de-

* Address delivered at the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the Catholic Anthropological Conference, Maryknoll, N. Y., 19 April, 1938.

velopment of our theology about man was circumstanced by heresies that insisted upon elevating man beyond the concept of Christianity. Christianity had, as you know, to fight its way through humanistic philosophy that was false; and our first theologians were God-conscious through Christ. They saw humanity in Christ, they explained humanity by Christ. And we to-day who study theology in the seminary still see ourselves and our brethren through our Lord, as we should. But so seeing humanity is not to know it in itself, but to know it theologically; and to know it teleologically. In a scientific sense, therefore, it is not to know it at all.

To-day, with increased transportation facilities, circulation of information through printing, we know more about humanity than we ever did before, than the world ever did before; and we know that many of man's activities are functional, rather than deductively determinate. We know that many of his acts, his social customs, habits, while not irrational, are not reasoned; that they are not the outcome of an ulterior purpose or design; that they are adaptively expressive of adjustment to environment or functional needs.

We, to-day, in studying human customs as expressed in language, in studying ethnology or any of the allied sciences, do not approach or study with a thesis mind. We do not think that we have to *prove* something. We take mankind as manifestly the most significant creation of God. We do not take mankind or the study of it as a test of our Faith; nor study it in an attempt to prove that Faith. Such an approach has been preferred in the past by Catholics as well as non-Catholics. It is a mistake and it is a cause for scandal. It is a cause for scandal to those who, thinking that all custom is determinate, the product of an ulterior purpose, discover to their amazement and chagrin that not all goodness must be ascribed to the supernatural or teleological. There are missioners who have gone out to pagan countries, to subnormal tribes, and finding among those people real goodness, were scandalized at the discovery. Others have attempted to trace through the ages, so to speak, the footsteps of Christ in order to explain the good features of the social customs and the religious outlook of peoples.

Why did they do this? Because they have made the initial assumption that all and anything that was good had to come

through and from Christian revelation. Anthropology shows that this is not so. Anthropology reëstablishes man as God meant him to be. Anthropology rescues man from Manichaeism and from Calvinism. It doesn't look upon him as damned from the beginning. Anthropology abhors the idea of a " massa damnata ". Anthropology, therefore, can protect the faith of individuals who by acquiring knowledge of man might, otherwise, (with false theories) be shocked, paradoxically enough, at the discovery of his goodness. Anthropology stops short, so to speak, at the Resurrection, but it stops short only there. In other words, the specific differential of Christianity is Revelation.

And it is at this point that the missioner takes up his task. As missioners we are going to be very selfish with all anthropologists. We are not going to tell you what we will contribute. We are not going to promise that we will collect material, that we will be field investigators, that we will chart the history of any social custom. Some of us may; most of us will not. We are going to be selfish and ask what *you* can contribute to *us;* not what we can contribute to you.

What can you contribute to us? I am sure that every priest has asked himself at one time or another, when thinking of conversion, at what point to begin. Do we have to teach people the alphabet of living? The people whom we meet in the East are far more expert in the alphabet of living than we are. It is easy to see why they should be. To the observer it is easy to understand why they must be. Psychologically, their field is narrow. We have to watch both worlds. They have to watch one—the world that they know, the world that they are sensible of and sensible to. And they know it very well. We have nothing to teach them, believe me; and they have much to teach us.

Can the anthropologists tell us where to begin? They should be able to. If the anthropologist has studied what is common to human expression everywhere; if the anthropologist has set limits, marking off the division between what I have called the functional and the determinate, then we missioners will know exactly where to begin. We will know at what point to tell our story, and our story is exclusively and specifically a *revealed* story and, therefore, it will be listened to.

I venture to say that, if in the preceding two centuries the Catholic scholars had been *more* rather than *less* conscious of Anthropology, our missioners would not have made as many mistakes as they have made. Some of them did not see that the customs of their nation and the development of their Catholic devotions were not essential to Christianity. They saw these customs, habits, and devotions as sanctified things. Such expressions were sanctified—they were sanctified by association, but they were not sanctified *in se*. These customs did not arise out of Christianity. They were developed by Christian peoples.

Anthropologists could have warned us of these things. Anthropologists could have warned us against being missioners of the natural; they could have warned us against the assumption and presumption that, because we were Catholic priests and sisters, we were superior to everyone else in every department of living. Whereas, we were bound by our own social weakness, and our superiority resided chiefly in that we knew the revelation of Christ and the people to whom we preached did not know it.

Why have missioners made these mistakes, mistakes made in good faith, out of a deep and serious conviction? They made them possibly because the anthropologists hadn't informed them soon enough. Years have been spent training pagan peoples in customs that have very little to do with Jesus Christ; have very little to do with revelation. Years were spent trying to teach people to live, people who knew better than we how to live—trying to teach people manners, whose manners, though different from ours, are often better than ours when understood; years spent teaching devotions, devotions that were the response, let us say, of the Irish mind to the Catholic Faith, of the German mind to the Faith, of the French mind to the Faith, of the Italian mind to the Faith—teaching devotions that were merely responses, reactions of a temperament, of an acquired character; not devotions that were lineally, logically related to Revelation and the missionary viewpoint.

The contribution of Anthropology will be made by giving attention to mankind—serious, dispassionate, unthesis-minded attention—setting out, not to prove that Revelation has extended back to pre-historic times, not as some anthropologists—

too many—do, to prove evolution or what-not, but a serious, dispassionate attention to *man himself,* honoring man and so worshipping God in His creation. By giving such attention to man, Anthropology will contribute to the missionary effort for conversion by teaching the missioners what mankind really is, and so teaching us, we will know where to start.

JAMES M. DROUGHT, M.M.

*Maryknoll, New York.*

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## ASSOCIATION OF OUR LADY OF A HAPPY DEATH.

The Association of Our Lady of Sorrows for a Happy Death was established by Pope Pius X, thirty years ago, on 22 July, 1908. It was placed under the direction of the Fathers of Saint Mary (Patres S. Mariae) near Saint Peter's in Rome.

Benedict XV and Pope Pius XI have issued briefs extending the Association's favors and privileges. It is most highly commended as a "universal Association of prayer, a union of perseverance, a league of zeal," a pious work and aid to a holy life and especially for a happy death. The Association is open to all and embraces every social condition and state of life.

Its aim is to obtain:

1. for the just, the grace of perseverance;
2. for the sinner, the grace of conversion;
3. for all, the grace of a happy death.

The means to attain this end are:

1. Union of prayer and good works in which the members share. Enrollment makes members participants of the spiritual treasury of the Church.
2. Devotion to Our Blessed Mother of Sorrows is fostered. A little prayer daily in union with Mary on Calvary is recommended. Her powerful protection is assured. St. Joseph, Helper of the Dying, is the second Patron of the Association.
3. Remembrance of, and meditation on, our last end and of the account we must render to God is another salutary means. Here the daily examination of conscience and at least a short reflexion on some eternal truth once a month are suggested.

These three means correspond to and constitute the three degrees of the Association. The first degree—enrollment—is essential. The second and third are optional. Parishes and institutes may keep their own enrollment list.

There are no fixed fees or collections, no renewals necessary. In order to coöperate in the spread of this great Association a voluntary offering according to one's means may be made, at least at the time the member is enrolled. This goes to the directorship in Rome for its expenses of leaflets (in all languages) and to perpetuate the Masses offered regularly for the living and deceased members of the Association.

Propagation of and enrolling in this apostolic Association in honor of Our Blessed Mother are done by volunteer promoters under priest directors who volunteer to devote themselves to this work and who have been appointed by the Reverend General Director.

For information and enrollment certificates, application may be made either to (1) Franciscan Fathers, Ben Avon, Pittsburgh, Pa.; (2) the Reverend Fintan M. Bru, O.S.B., 1720 St. Bernard Ave., New Orleans, Louisiana, (3) the Diocesan Director, if there is one appointed by the ordinary, (4) to the Reverend Director General, P.S.M., 17 via dei Penitenzieri, Rome (113), Italy.

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## RELIGIOUS VOCATIONS.

A priest has many precious opportunities to direct the life or rather the ways of the life of young people, by means of talks on vocations, in instructions, or in Sunday School, in the confessional, or in social intercourse. In the present materialistic age, it is of great importance that the priest speak to the young people regarding their vocations, especially to those who do not feel themselves called to the dignity of the priesthood, but who still show by their talents and dispositions that they are called to a higher or spiritual life. To such young men we recommend the life of a missioner, or a brother to care for the sick. To both of these do the words of our Divine Lord apply: "The laborers are few, but the labor is great." If one feels an inclination toward such a vocation, it is advisable to join a congregation; for this not only safeguards the vocation and appoints

the field of labor, but also furnishes freedom from worry about support.

Young men who feel inclined to devote their life to the cause of humanity will find a splendid opportunity for this by joining the Brothers of Mercy, Buffalo, N. Y. This Congregation has a twofold purpose: 1. the sanctification of its own members; 2. active charity by caring for the sick in their homes or in hospitals, or in religious houses.

The Brothers of Mercy are active in twelve dioceses in Europe and America, having thirty-one houses and three novitiates. Their institute has received the approbation of the Holy See itself, as well as of European and American Bishops.

Young men from seventeen to thirty-seven years of age, who feel themselves drawn for the love of God, to devote their lives to the care of the sick, or other works of charity, are received into this congregation. They spend their time of novitiate and postulate at the Novitiate House, 49 Cottage Street, Buffalo, New York.

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## CUSTODIAN OF TABERNACLE KEY IN A CONVENT.

*Qu.* According to the Instruction of the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments, of May, 1938, who is the custodian of the tabernacle key in a Brothers' or Sisters' convent to which a resident chaplain is attached? Where should the key or keys be kept?

*Resp.* The resident chaplain is responsible for the care of the tabernacle key in a convent of Brothers or Sisters, as is clearly indicated in canon 1269, § 4, and repeated in the Instruction. He may intrust its actual custody to another, and in a convent chapel the natural custodian will be one of the superiors and the sacristan, who, in the absence of the chaplain, will see to it that the key is kept in a safe place, especially at night.

As for the place where the key is kept, the Instruction says: "It is important that the place where the key is kept be of easy access day and night, so that he (the custodian) may easily locate it if need arise, and may exercise continual vigilance in regard to it." In this country, the usual place for the key is in the sacristy in the safe where the chalices and ciboria are kept. This safe is in turn locked and the key deposited in a place known only to the rector of the church and the sacristan or

housekeeper. Usually, and preferably, there are two keys for the tabernacle and the safe, unless the latter is opened by a combination lock. In a convent, as the Instruction mentions, these keys are kept by a superior and a sacristan, both of whom can be easily located, so that in case of fire or sick-call, the chaplain may obtain the key at once. As a rule, the key to the safe is hidden in a place known to the sacristan and the chaplain. In every case, however, it is the duty of the priest in charge of the Blessed Sacrament to designate how and where the key to the tabernacle is to be kept.

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## ANTE-NUPTIAL AGREEMENT A LEGAL CONTRACT.

*Qu.* Can the signed agreement required before the granting of a dispensation from the impediment of disparity of worship and mixed religion be considered a contract in the legal sense of the term?

*Resp.* The ante-nuptial agreement contains the essential elements of a legal contract. For a rather full discussion of the question consult *Canonical Ante-nuptial Promises and the Civil Law,"* by the Rev. R. J. White, J.C.D. (Washington, The Catholic University of America.)

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## CHALICE RAISED TO BE SEEN BY CONGREGATION.

*Qu.* Is it necessary that, at the elevation of the chalice at the consecration of the Mass, the cup of the chalice be at least higher than the priest's head and be easily visible to the people? Few priests elevate the chalice high enough to enable the public to see the whole cup and to gain the indulgence attached to the prayer, " Dominus meus et Deus meus," whilst looking at the chalice.

*Resp.* " After the consecration, he (the priest) places the chalice on the altar, and while saying in a low voice, *Haec quotiescumque,* etc., he genuflects and adores. Rising he takes the chalice by the knob with his right hand, and its foot with his left hand, keeping his eyes fixed upon it, and raises it in a straight line over the corporal, so that the people may see it." [1] " So he (the celebrant) elevates the chalice to a height where it can be seen by the people above his head." [2]

[1] O'Callaghan, *Sacred Ceremonies of Low Mass,* p. 106.
[2] Fortescue, *The Ceremonies of the Roman Rite Described,* p. 60.

# Ecclesiastical Library Table

## RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

What is philosophy and who are philosophers are questions more difficult to answer as the books, the claims and limitations of authors and publishers flood in upon us.

The classifications of various book-review periodicals reflect this difficulty. With some there is no heading under which philosophical literature can be grouped. Such literature is either ignored or is listed under "Books also Received" by some professional reviewers. By others, philosophical literature is associated with religion. Books on these distinctively different fields are considered akin. In other cases reviewers of philosophical literature with access to neither religious nor philosophical sections steal into the biographical departments and evaluate philosophy there. Science, history, economics and every other branch of learning and writing find their review sections receiving philosophical foundlings for which publishers have made no honorable and definite provisions. In the midst of this ignorance of classification and of merit philosophical expression increases. It is amazing, when one writes to publishers and editors for lists of philosophers and philosophical books to view their answers. Despite the fact that no worthwhile concern is without its philosophical consultant, there is no unanimity about what is and what is not philosophical. In other words, even the Ph.D.'s who are working for our best publishers and reviews are not sure what philosophy is, where it belongs, and where it stops.

How far we should delve under titles of works to discover where philosophy is and where it is not, is not indicated by scholastic training, but it ought to be. How alert scholastics ought to be in their effort to trace wrong movements to bad philosophy is not prescribed but is necessary. Literature, incidental to philosophers, but loaded with philosophy and professionally concerned with the sciences, the stage, literature, history, is abundant and is challenging. Philosophy often is not found where the grooved scholastic expects to find it.

Philosophy is most often deficient and uninteresting when presented by professional philosophers. Maybe it is because

most professional philosophers are suffering from the inferiority feeling that they will be ridiculed. Maybe it is because they do not realize that the non-philosophical world does not know it is groping through a maze of problems to the principles that philosophy discovered ages ago. Perhaps they do not know that, while philosophers may be thought to be crazy people, no one can escape from being a philosopher. While the appellation may be odious, the instinct to and expression of philosophy are inevitable.

The point is this. Many authors who hate philosophy are presenting their hatred attractively—but not without the help of some kind of philosophy. Many who love philosophy are presenting their love unattractively and with a disregard for the language and feelings of non-philosophers. Many scientists do not know they have affinities among scientists. Many scientists do not realize that they have cognates among the philosophers who repudiate unscientific philosophy. Many philosophers do not realize that they have cognates among the scientists who repudiate non-philosophical science.

One of the problems of an integrating philosophy is to bring such groups together in round-table talks, in literature and in mutual discussion. One of the problems of a basic science is to contact such groups and to recognize that philosophy as the beginning and the culmination of science cannot be ignored by even a workaday scientific investigator.

The fact that many scientists, in the broader sense, are either ignoring or repudiating philosophy, may be overlooked even by careful students at this time. The fact that so many, even new scholastics are either ignoring or belittling the call of science for their attention may also be ignored. The stress at this time must be placed on those who consciously or unconsciously are indicating, in their works that philosophy cannot be divorced from any one of the natural or social sciences any more than it can be divorced from life. The ladies and gentlemen from either side of this mythical line will be drawn in more by the power of imitation than by the power of appeal.

The die-hards who think they are divorced or who hope to keep the ideas of philosophy and of science endlessly divorced are suspect. It is not difficult to understand that lazy thinkers may creep into the service of alert book-reviewing publications.

It is easy to understand why even representative publishers should suffer from the review editors who do not know the difference between philosophy, religion and science. But it is very difficult to understand why persons, thought able enough to handle the task of classifying books or of assorting book reviews, should be so unaware of the fact that philosophers are not necessarily to be classified among scripturalists and preachers and that all preachers must not be grouped with philosophers. Neither are men whose names are primarily associated with one branch of science, like physics, to be classified irrevocably among scientists, even when they present a professionally philosophical point of view.

The confusion which exists and to which we may have added in pointing it out, is a state which indicates healthy progress of learning. Philosophy is gradually assimilating, with the help of its emphasis on auxiliary sciences, the antinomies of its own field. Science is producing an increasing number of independent thinkers who believe their ultimate explanations cannot be offered without philosophy and that philosophy is not religion. Philosophy is producing thinkers who are respected by science as scientists and science is producing men who command respect as philosophers, even among scholastic philosophers.

Behind this general confusion is the general difficulty with which even Catholic and scholastic educators are familiar. It is a difficulty of distinguishing between philosophy, science and religion, and is based on a misconception of the respective fields of these interests. Catholic publishers, as well as, if not as often as their non-Catholic associates, confuse these fields in offering their presentations. Some difficulty is found in this, that many scholastics on whom publishers rely, dispute among themselves theoretically as to the lines of demarcation between theology, philosophy and science. Other publishers depend on scholars who know no boundary lines between these fields and who poach, even when they do not know that they are trespassing.

The lack of understanding of the almost indefinable limits marking philosophy apart from every other branch of knowledge is not limited to non-Catholic scholars. And among our Catholic scholars there is no definite field in which special narrowness can be picked out. Our cosmology and psychology have been advanced by the battering they have taken from

contemporary research in physics, chemistry, biology, anthropology, geology and paleontology. Our logic has taken a new direction through contemporary mathematics. To every branch of scholastic philosophy has been issued a challenge by a correlative field in science. To every correlative field of every other science scholastic philosophy must make known its understanding of their need for the purposes of correlation, refutation and integration. Integration is a very important objective. Integration of the findings of all the students of the sciences added to the integration which philosophy can accomplish within its ranks will make for an integral synthesis for which we are hoping. Frontiers have to be crossed and thought must be captured wherever it is found.

Recently we have had a procession of biographies of thinkers, some of whom are philosophers and all of them are of interest to philosophers. *Architects of Ideas*,[1] by Ernest R. Trattner, gives a title much more attractive than the book it identifies. Mr. Trattner thinks the interrelation of facts is one of the functions of science, and in fifteen chapters he essays an integration that covers fields as disparate as astronomy and anthropology. Great names and personages parade in gripping splendor. Copernicus, Hutton, Dalton, Lavoisier, Rumford, Malthus, Schwann, Darwin, Marx, Pasteur, Boas, Einstein and others are made to tell their stories accurately and attractively. Some limitations of the collection are almost unpardonable at this stage of enlightenment about the middle ages. We must conspire to laugh out of court writers who still look on the thirteenth century as a period of mental stagnation when revelation and logic were confused, when scientists were labelled by the Church as magicians, and philosophers were heretics. It is tragic that at this date a man who could collect such an interesting book should be controlled by so many superstitions.

Out of China is creeping the news of thousands upon thousands of conversions to Christianity and the majority of them to Catholicity. We have been asking for some time for a scholastic study of the philosophy that made possible the life and thoughts which our missionaries are trying to meet. There

[1] New York, Carrick and Evans.

is an approach to such an understanding in *Master Kung;*[2] *The Story of Confucius,* by Carl Crow.

Some of our contemporary philosophers of civilization look upon Confucius as a failure. They are probably affected by their Nietzschean hatred of the submissive virtues. This story of Confucius will give little help in deciding whether he was or was not an asset to civilization. But it will help one to understand the historical background of the hundreds of millions whom the ethics of Confucius has formed and the national policy which it has created. Confucius shared the fate of many other great philosophers who were not appreciated. Aristotle was not the least of these and his fate was even harder. But in the light of history and in the perspective of the ages, there is an amusing side to Master Kung's career. This biography seems to aim to bring out the witty, the paradoxical and the human phases of the activities of a great statesman and reformer. The philosopher must know all of this when he is evaluating the effect of Confucius on life. This is a well written volume by a very modest author who disclaims a knowledge of philosophy but who knows Master Kung.

*Charles Darwin,*[3] by Geoffrey West, is another biography which the historian of philosophy cannot ignore any more than he can neglect the philosophical consequences of Evolutionism. The Darwinian theory as such has lost favor, but this biography will help stimulate interest in Darwin. Mr. West writes after so long a study of the subject that Darwin to him is one of the supermen of all time. He admits, however, that the scientist was biased, and he offers enough evidence to justify the admission that he was irresponsible. This biography emphasizes the consequences of the Darwinian hypothesis on other philosophers like Marx and Nietzsche.

Also of help to the philosopher who must pursue ideas into the field of science and into the lives of scientists is *Isaac Newton, 1642-1727,*[4] by J. W. N. Sullivan. The late author spent ten years in the preparation of this volume and while

[2] New York, Harper and Brothers.
[3] New Haven, Yale University Press.
[4] New York, The Macmillan Co.

he contributes little that is new, he does give us an organized synthesis of what Newton wrote and of what has been written about him. Newton was a man of deep meditation, but not of deep friendships. He withheld many of his scientific discoveries for years, perhaps because he distrusted people; but he fought endlessly for his principles and his honor. Known primarily as a scientist of optics and mathematics, he was more interested, during his later years, indirectly, in theology, and incidentally in philosophy. With a remarkable faculty of finding answers to problems in nature herself rather than in authors, he created a really scientific method. But he realized, as Sullivan points out, that science is only one way and a very incomplete way of discovering truth.

Of later date but of similar significance to philosophers is *In the Spirit of William James*,[5] by Dr. Ralph Barton Perry. Dr. Perry reveals himself here as a great biographer and expositor to those who have always known him as one of America's leading philosophers. The philosophy of James is presented sympathetically and critically against the background of his life and beginning with his colleague and friendly enemy Josiah Royce. Of special interest in this exposition is the explanation of the political and social philosophy of James. Its classification under liberalism seems to imply that liberty demands the trial of anything and everything, even the absurd, with the possibility and in the hope that it will work and therefore be true.

*Pavlov and His School*,[6] by Y. P. Prolov, M.D., is also a frontier book for philosophers. It is a synthesis of the teaching of the great Russian scientist on his theory of conditioned reflexes and is presented against the screen of his very unusual life.

The past six months has given scholars a number of worthwhile and really philosophical books. *An Introduction to Logic*,[7] by Jacques Maritain, is among these. It is an exceptionally good translation of his *Petite Logique*, and gives an excellent presentation of Aristotelico-Thomistic formal logic. Many are disappointed that even in introduction to Logic fails

[5] New Haven, Yale University Press.
[6] New York, Oxford University Press.
[7] New York, Sheed and Ward.

to give more attention to inductive reasoning and to symbolic logic. From the pen of Maritain we have *Les Degrés du Savoir,* done into English by Bernard Wall and Margot R. Adamson, under the title *The Degrees of Knowledge.*[8] The limitations of the translation are due in great measure to both the profundity of Maritain's thought and the complexity of his style. However, even with these many limitations, some of them serious, it is an advantage to have this well known work available for those unable to read it in the second French edition. The degrees of knowledge are common sense, natural science, mathematics, metaphysics, theology and perfect wisdom. They are really levels as well as degrees of knowledge. In ascending realization they will restore integration of life as well as unification of learning. The general thesis represents an intricate elaboration of a Thomistic division of knowledge into a basic philosophy of culture and civilization.

A fast-moving and interesting story is told by Joseph Jastrow in *The Betrayal of Intelligence.*[9] The volume is a protest against the failure of people to think and thus to protect themselves against " system-mongers and piffle-peddlers ". It earns its sub-title, " A Preface to Debunking," by exposing some of our contemporary substitutes for real thinking. He is vitriolic in his criticism of popular short-cuts to intelligence manifested in " how to " books, radio addresses and in the class room. The last chapters of the book insists on thinking as its own reward, thinking for oneself as an obligation and the making of a logical mind. Dr. Jastrow is more successful as an iconoclast than as a reconstructionist.

Miss K. W. Wild has given students an interesting study of the human mind in *Intuition.*[10] She approaches the problem first by analyzing the word " intuition " as used by Bergson, Spinoza, Croce, Jung and Whitehead and then by classifying other and manifold uses of the word. She points out the significance of intuitive ideas and beliefs in the realms of religion, morals and esthetics and indicates evidences of knowledge in

[8] New York, Charles Scribner's Sons.
[9] New York, Greenberg.
[10] New York, The Macmillan Co.

which reason plays no part in men of genius like Marcus Aurelius, Goethe, Rousseau and Henry Ford. It is a volume that suggests a field of research for scholastic philosophy.

Religion and its philosophy have occasioned several interesting volumes in the past six months. *Psychology and Religion*,[11] by Carl Gustav Jung, finds the source of religion not in revelation, theological argument, spiritual insight, nor reason, but in the unconscious. As usual, in the development of this thesis Jung manifests his traditional disagreement with Freud in insisting on psychosynthesis as well as psychoanalysis and in emphasizing implicitly the importance of philosophy as an aid to science. While he insists that he speaks as physician and not as philosopher, his dependence on philosophical generalization is evident. He avoids the evaluation of religious beliefs but insists on the value of every religion to health of mind. Religion is natural because it springs from unconscious personal instinct of helplessness native in the individual and inherited in brain structure from ages of similar ancestral impulse. Nowhere is intelligent reasoning taken into account and nowhere is there recognition of the divine authorship of the religious instinct. Dr. Jung is most interesting, though equally unacceptable, when expatiating on the conscious realization by the individual of this unconscious possession, on the efforts of some individuals to suppress the call of the religious craving and on the transference of worship from the Divine to some substitute like the State. Nations attempting to ignore or to crush religious life in their peoples are sure to create misery among all. It is passing strange how this clever medico could reach so correct a conclusion from erroneous premises. In and out, around and between these basic ideas of the volume is a constant stream of facts, superstitions, myths, symbols and erroneous allegations about religion and dogma. They betray the age-old danger of any *a priori* interpretation of facts.

*The Validity of Religious Experience*,[12] by F. E. England, recognizes that religious experience can be enjoyed by even an unreflective person and proceeds to establish " the inseparable

[11] New York, Yale University Press.
[12] New York, Harper and Brothers.

character of the intuitive and interpretative elements in that experience". Dr. England attempts a gigantic task in essaying to show the "organic connection of religious experience with the rest of reality, first, by indicating the relation of the human personality to reality as a whole, and secondly, by a psychological analysis of the experience". An interesting section of the volume is devoted to an examination of various attempts to explain religious experience on subjective and non-transcendent grounds and to a rejection of certain empirical and *a priori* methods of establishing the validity of religious experience. The author is not unassuming when he says that in his last two chapters, "by elucidating the principle of 'progressive discrimination' and a 'hierarchized whole of realty' I claim to offer a solid basis for religious conviction, alike in the realms of epistemology and metaphysics." But in these two chapters, devoted to "The Nature of Apprehension" and "The Supreme Object of Religious Experience," one cannot say that the claims of the author are realized. He is, however, a widely read and a vastly experienced scholar who represents a point of view which neoscholastic philosophers of religion cannot ignore.

Arthur L. Swift, Jr., Associate Professor of applied Christianity at Union Theological Seminary gives us *New Frontiers of Religion*.[13] It is a sociological approach to the study of religion or really the sociology of religion. This latter the author defines as "the scientific study of the origins of religion as a social institution, its development, the varying forms it has assumed and the functions it has fulfilled with special reference to the scope and meaning of these functions in themselves and in relation to the functioning of other contemporary social institutions." The author reduces his task to this, "What is the relation between organized religion, especially Protestantism and social change?" He divides his problem into two parts, the effect of religion upon change, and in twenty-one chapters covers the field interestingly though along broad lines. It is distressing to find a teacher in a Protestant seminary so frequently misinformed about Catholic philosophy and life. He is not abusive; sometimes he is laudatory; but often his classi-

[13] New York, The Macmillan Co.

fication of our practices is made with subtle irony. He pays tribute to the power of the Church to integrate thought and life in the Middle Ages and recognizes the multiplicity of its contacts with the common life of the faithful. He traces the disintegration of Protestantism to its failure to maintain such contacts. The writer is thought-provoking in his acceptance of the indictment that Protestantism and Capitalism are mutually reënforcing. He is analytical but not constructive in his diagnosis of the differences between city and rural religion. He is descriptive but not scientific in overstressing the effect of social change on religion. He is keen in recognizing the value of authority in Catholic faith but hesitant in tracing the source of this authority. There is much in Chapter 17, "Worship and the Reality of God," that makes reparation for inaccuracies, half-truths and misleading juxtapositions of other chapters. "If ever there was a period now in our history when man needed to renew his faith in God it is now. There can be no greater disservice to the cause of religion than the effort to reduce it to humanistic terms." Wise words are these.

*Resources For Living*,[14] by Gains Glenn Atkins, is called also *A Plain Man's Philosophy*. It belongs under books dealing with the philosophy of religion. The author is not a plain man. For thirty years he was a noted preacher. He is a recognized authority in comparative religions and the author of *Modern Religious Cults and Movements, Procession of the Gods,* and *The Making of the Christian Mind*. He is proclaimed as a sympathetic and a kindly man who "understands better than most bishops and all scoffers, that religion is not a thing in itself, but only one expression of man's eternal effort to feel at home in the universe." That advertisement locates this latest work of Atkins and identifies his philosophy of religion. The author gives one reason to think that he accepts Evolution, that he neither cares for nor understands the scholastic philosophy of personality, that he does not catch the meaning of dogma and revelation and that he is unaware of our ethics of purity and self-control. In fact, whilst Atkins writes beautifully, he generalizes easily and without understanding of the real nature of

[14] New York, Harper and Brothers.

truth, ontological or logical, human or divine. Chapter 2, entitled "Our Prophetic Surplus," is a charming, if not always accurate, description of human faculties, capacities and powers, with emphasis on cognitive, emotional and creative equipment in relation to environment. Chapter 3, "The Resource of Labor," is a touching appeal for a recognition of the spiritual and religious value of diligence and toil. In all these chapters psychology, esthetics, metaphysics, cosmology, social philosophy and history tumble on to page after page in seeming disorder but with arresting beauty. Man meets himself, man meets the cosmos, man meets the giants of history, man meets his neighbor, man meets society and gives to and gets from it, but man seldom meets here God and his Christ. It is difficult to reconcile this with a philosophy of living for the plain man. Esthete! Humanitarian! How can the plain man tell the plain man where God is? That would be a real resource for genuine living.

*Ethics:*[15] *From the Standpoint of Scholastic Philosophy,* by J. Elliot Ross, Ph.D., goes into its third edition. It comes so vastly improved in content and appearance and so modernized that it will continue to be a most popular text and reference book. Teachers who use even the new edition will have to supplement the text with a more complete and more scholastic explanation of the nature and the norms of morality.

*The Law and Mr. Smith,*[16] by Max Radin, is a scholarly yet simple explanation of the philosophy of law. With amazing facility the author makes intelligible to the ordinary citizen in a democracy the intricacies of comparative jurisprudence. Better citizenship is evidently the aim of the author, but better lawyers can also be produced by a study of its pages. It is a valuable reference book also for philosophers in the field of ethics.

Social Philosophy has been especially enriched during the past six months by many valuable contributions. *Catholicism, Communism and Dictatorship,*[17] by C. J. Eustace, is a contribution by a well known author to isolated phases of social philosophy. He points out the deeper philosophical significance of irreligion

[15] New York, The Devin-Adair Co.
[16] Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Co.
[17] New York, Benziger Brothers.

and immorality in social life. He is curious in his explanation of totalitarianism as a substitute for the real value that would answer the craving of men for a spirit of unity. This real value can be found only in religion. There is some reason to suspect that Eustace is not sympathetic with democratic or representative government. When criticism of such form of government is based on the teachings of St. Thomas one must object. The Angelic Doctor was a protagonist of representative or democratic government.

Ross Hoffman with *Tradition and Progress* [18] appears again with broad and clear thinking. This fine collection of essays and reviews is based on the conviction that history or purposive development of life is something distinctively Christian. He insists that history and apologetics are distinct even though the Catholic apologist has the right to make use of history. In the field of social philosophy Professor Hoffman gives challenging observations on the relation between liberty and the wide distribution of property at the birth of our own nation, down through the generations here and in Soviet Russia to-day. The author can be counted on for continued and stimulating service to sound social and political philosophy.

Here is a book which is indicative of a new trend in the ranks of physical scientists. The book is *The Pendulum Swings Back*,[19] by Marvin M. Black, with a foreword by Dr. Charles A. Ellwood. The trend is born of the amazement of the worshippers of physical science that their idol has not achieved social peace. This amazement is evident in several important contributions to social philosophy by authors recognized in the world of physical science. In this book Black insists that science alone is important to solve world problems and that the scientist must, if he really think, become a philosopher. He must furthermore prepare himself to assume the rôle of philosopher if he is really to serve humanity. As a corollary of this, social research and social science must be completed by social and integrating philosophy if humanity is to be bettered. From a new quarter comes the cry for philosophy to integrate physical sciences, social sciences and life itself for progressive betterment.

[18] Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing Co.

[19] Nashville, Tenn., Cokesbury Press.

Animated by the same purpose of bringing physical science to the service of social betterment is *The Intelligent Individual and Society*,[20] by P. W. Bridgeman. He is professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy at Harvard. He is intent on straighter thinking on social questions as they affect both the individual and men in the mass. Old modes of thinking are inadequate for a new philosophy of living. New social concepts can and must be secured " through the application of the same principles as those underlying the amazing progress in physics during the last thirty years ". The first third of the book might be called psychological or epistemological and it is difficult to see here any new contribution to social thinking. Following this is an analysis of " various *concepts* which hold society together ". Among these are duty, freedom, rights, morality, justice, the State, race survival, service, and idealism. This is all interesting but one is lead to the conviction that the scientist crashing into social philosophy is about as helpful as were the physicists when, some years back, they turned metaphysicians and theologians. Much ado is made by Bridgeman about the limitations an intelligent individual must face in adjusting himself to his social environment. Here again he is bothered by epistemological difficulties; but his " supreme social limitation " is the isolation of the individual. What a help it might be for him and others who cannot understand the correlation between legitimate selfishness and obligatory altruism to know the teaching of Aquinas on this supreme social limitation. In the chapters on " Human Traits " and " Social Demands and Conventions " one meets well worded recognition of facts already discovered and more pithily stated by Confucius. One wonders where expertness in physics has helped here. Law, government, the use of physical force, social reform and education come in for their share of attention, but nowhere is there an original contribution. One is impressed by the title of the last chapter, " What of It? " One answer is that social philosophers may be consoled if this book can induce physicists who respect Bridgeman to look away from laboratories to people. Another answer is that socially-minded scientists are knocking at the gates of philosophy and must be admitted.

[20] New York, The Macmillan Co.

*Man the Slave and the Master*,[21] by Mark Graubard, is called " a biological approach to the potentialities of modern society ". It reads like another act of contrition, written by a biologist, for the neglect, by the laboratory, of the " social implications of science ". Again we have a noted scientist who is of little help to social philosophy because he knows neither social science nor social relationships. He steals into the domain of social philosophy with complete abandonment of the scientific caution that controls him in his laboratory. The author proposes to find justification for progressivism of all kinds in biological data. He calls loudly for " scientific humanism ". He smacks of reprehensible propaganda in his unabashed materialism, but he does not indicate definitely the goal to which the realization of all these potentialities is leading. He is condemned also by that with which he agrees. The means of production do not determine the organization of society. Culture is not always determined by social organization. Changes in economic environment do not always alter beliefs and ideologies. No scholastic can be unappreciative of the effort incorporated in this volume and none will ignore his responsibility to be familiar with its point of view.

J. S. B. Haldane is another biologist who invades the social sciences. In *Heredity and Politics*[22] he evidently wishes to demonstrate that total social betterment does not lie in the direction pointed out by eugenics and sterilization. He offers little help to the scientific philosopher in the support of this contention.

Francis W. Coker of Yale compiles *Readings in Political Philosophy*,[23] in which he traces the evolution of political thought up to the nineteenth century. This is a revised and enlarged edition of a previous work which has won well deserved recognition.

In the same vein we have *History of Political Philosophy from Plato to Burke*,[24] by Thomas I. Cook, B.Sc. It is a worth-

[21] New York, Covici, Friede.
[22] W. W. Norton and Co.
[23] New York, The Macmillan Co.
[24] Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing Co.

while survey of political philosophy and it is singular because it claims that " Catholic social philosophy is discussed more fairly and fully than in previous books on the subject ". His realization of this claim is not confined to his needless discussion about Jesuits and Dominicans in regard to the counter-Reformation.

It is amazing that such an expert as Sorokin could have praised so highly *A History of Social Philosophy*,[25] by Charles A. Ellwood. The author is a pioneer who consciously or not helped to emancipate sociology from grossly biological interpretation of social relationships. In his history of social philosophy he has slighted those who, perhaps unknown to him, are his strongest allies. His understanding of the scholastic contribution to social philosophy and his evaluation of St. Thomas Aquinas as a social philosopher disappoint many who hoped for bigger things from Ellwood. Yet, maybe Sorokin is correct in saying that this history of social philosophy is " the best that exists ".

Now we have a book spreading over the fields of social philosophy and ethics which sets a pattern for other investigators and writers. *Honesty*,[26] by Richard C. Cabot, already a distinguished scholar and author, is further evidence of his genius. A pattern is set here because we need a series of studies pointing out the personal, social, national and international consequences of fealty to the basic natural virtues. Cabot has been toying with honesty in these aspects for half a century. He has not wasted his time. He is brilliant in his application of his basic definitions and distinctions of honesty to war, crime, government, industry, science, education, medicine, social work, art, social relations, and religion. He is even more magnetic in the third section of his book where he discusses in six chapters the " Philosophy of Honesty ". Scholastic moralists cannot always agree with Cabot, but they have in him a technique that cannot be ignored.

Two dissertations have come from the School of Philosophy of the Catholic University of America that concern the field of social philosophy as well as that of Religion. *The Metaphysical Foundations of Dialectical Materialism*,[27] by the Reverend Charles McFadden, O.S.A., Ph.D., is a most penetrating

[25] New York, Prentice-Hall Inc. [26] New York, The Macmillan Co.
[27] Washington, D. C., The Catholic University of America.

philosophical diagnosis of Marxism with which our social philosophy has been endowed. *The Problem of Solidarism in St. Thomas*,[28] by Sister Joan of Arc Wolfe, O.S.F., Ph.D., is the Thomistic answer to the haunting problem already referred to —the seeming conflict between the right of the individual to existence and development and the obligation of the individual to regard the development of society as self-development.

It is evident from the philosophical literature of the last six months that great emphasis is being placed on social philosophy. Another evidence of this is a very important volume, *Knowledge and Society*,[29] a philosophical approach to modern civilization by a group of professors in the Department of Philosophy at the University of California. This volume seeks to trace the relation between philosophy and "human" civilization. The first part of the book deals with the theme of human knowledge and includes chapters on Common Sense, Scientific Method, Scientific Method and Hypothesis, The Domain of Metaphysics, Philosophical Aspects of Religion, The Freedom of the Will and Skepticism. The second part of the book deals with society and its most valuable chapters are: The Rise of Modern Individualism, Economic Freedom, Political Freedom, Natural Security, Social Purpose, Reconstruction or Revolution?, Philosophy and American Life. It would be a mistake to praise this work too highly because one might get meshed up in many of its inaccuracies. But it is safe to say that the complete social philosophy yet to be written will have frequent recourse to this excellent coöperative effort of the Professors of the University of California.

Psychology gives philosophers a modicum of help this half year. *Psychotherapy*,[30] by Paul Schilder, deals largely with the types of tools and systems of this science. Philosophers and priests will be interested in his analysis of schizophrenia. *The Origin of Life*,[31] by A. I. Oparin and translated by S. Morgulis, stresses the evolution of life as matter. He is not a mechanist. He is worthy of the attention of contemporary neo-Scholastics because of his technique in dealing with auxiliary sciences like

[28] Washington, D. C., The Catholic University of America.
[29] New York, D. Appleton-Century Co.
[30] New York, W. W. Norton and Co. [31] New York, The Macmillan Co.

astronomy, geology, meteorology, physics, chemistry and physiology.

The philosophy of education would be better off under the supervision of philosophers who know education rather than under pedagogues who know little philosophy. *Experience and Education*,[32] by John Dewey, gives a synthesis of the theories of this eighty-year old international influence. Skills, self-realization, imposition of standards from above, the cultivation of individuality—all of these so glibly adopted by others, even Catholic educators, need their semblance of truth and their potential wickedness thrown against the screens of sound scholastic philosophy and unbiased history.

The history of philosophy means both the development of thought and the presentation of the antecedents and the environment of thinkers. We are grateful for *The Gateway to the Middle Ages*,[33] by Eleanor Shipley Duckett. It helps us understand the forefathers of the great scholastics and gives us real insight into the literary and educational work of Boëthius.

With *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*,[34] by Etienne Gilson, the entire scholastic world is already familiar. Gilson alone has done for Bonaventure what he and a hundred others have done for the intimate friend of Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas. No doubt the curiosity of persons about the relative merits of these two incomparable doctors will make this monumental work of Gilson attractive. Let it be hoped that they will be able to discover in this mighty contribution to the history of philosophy the basic agreements of these two intellectual and sanctified leaders on frontal philosophical truths of the Church.

*High Points of Medieval Culture*,[35] by James J. Walsh, is another and more scientific stage-setting of medieval philosophy by the noted author of *The Thirteenth the Greatest of Centuries*. No historian of philosophy can afford to be far away from Dr. Walsh even though discriminate evaluation be necessary.

*Thought and Expression in the Sixteenth Century*[36] is by Henry Osborn Taylor, a scholar and author who seeks truth

[32] New York, The Macmillan Co.
[33] New York, The Macmillan Co.
[34] New York, Sheed and Ward.
[35] Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing Co.
[36] New York, The Macmillan Co.

above prejudice, even when he seems to be prejudiced. A scholastic will be grateful, in the interests of common truth, to know this fine thinker's mind about Humanism, Erasmus, Luther, and especially his understanding of the historical relations of philosophy and science.

Mortimer Adler has again given us a volume in which the notes are more valuable than the text. *St. Thomas and the Gentiles* [37] goes down in our history of philosophy as the work of an extraordinary genius. It is belittling the philosophical accomplishments of this man to say that they are startling merely because he is not writing as a believer. It is also a tribute to the truth of scholasticism that even handicapped by early ignorance of Thomism he has found in the *Contra Gentiles* so complete a solution of the problems of modern thought and life.

At last we have the English translation by Ernest C. Messenger of the sacred volume of Maurice De Wulf's *History of Medieval Philosophy*.[38] Both of these scholars have done splendid duty to truth. This new English version is up to date. Some omissions are detectable, but taken in entirety it is a volume which every teacher or student of scholastic philosophy must have. The volume fails to disclose the wider social reasons for antagonism to Thomism and for the decline of Scholasticism. The history of medieval philosophy cannot be written, and the history of any other period of philosophy cannot be written, without reference to religious, political, economic and social conditions of each respective era.

*The Observational Approach to Cosmology*,[39] by Edwin Hubble, is the record of the Rhodes Memorial Lectures delivered at Oxford in the Autumn of 1936. Philosophers of this country will be interested principally, in this technical study, in the third chapter, which deals with possible worlds.

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[37] Milwaukee, Milwaukee University Press.
[38] New York, Longmans Green and Co.
[39] New York, Oxford University Press.

# Book Reviews

**HISTOIRE DE L'EGLISE. Tome VI. L'epoque carolingienne. Par Emile Amann. Bloud et Gay, Paris, France.**

The results of recent research into the beginnings of the Greek schism pursued by the Reverend F. Dvornik, professor of ecclesiastical history at Prague University, the Assumptionist Fathers Grumel and Jugie, and the abbé Amann, professor in the faculty of Catholic theology at Strasbourg University have excited much interest in Europe. Indeed it is not every day that the account of events of very great ecclesiastical and religious importance, accepted unquestioningly for centuries in the West and narrated in substantially the same form in all Catholic ecclesiastical history text-books and works of reference, is dismissed by our most competent scholars in the field as a " fable ", a " hoax ", an " empty legend "; and this, too, in consequence of researches undertaken with the direct encouragement of the Holy See. Moreover, these surprising results, though concerned with events of a thousand years ago, have considerable practical importance in view of the work for the reunion of the Eastern Orthodox with the Catholic Church which is one of the happier features of the times in which we live.

According to the story hitherto received, and popularized in English by, for example, the late Dr. Fortescue's book *The Orthodox Eastern Church,* the chief author of the schism of the Byzantines was Photius, a man of huge learning and of personal virtue, except that he was a monster of pride and ambition. He allowed himself to be intruded into the patriarchal chair of Constantinople, whose legitimate occupant, St. Ignatius, had been deposed by the emperor Michael III the Drunkard; during subsequent discussions with Rome (in which the dispute about jurisdiction over the Bulgars and eastern Illyricum soon cropped up) Photius professed to excommunicate Pope St. Nicholas I, whereupon the pope excommunicated him. Photius fell from power in 867 and, two years later, what has hitherto been regarded as the eighth oecumenical council (Constantinople iv) solemnly renewed his condemnation. In 878 he was recalled to be patriarch and, St. Ignatius being now dead, was recognized as such by Pope John VIII: whereupon Photius convened a synod in 879-80 at which, having cajoled the papal legates to agree, he rehabilitated himself and the acts of the council of 869 were annulled (the " second schism "). John VIII consequently excommunicated him anew, and this excommunication was repeated by his successors, Popes Marinus I, Adrian III, Stephen VI (V) and Formosus. Such is the story in general outline.

Professor Dvornik and Father Grumel, working independently, have reached a conclusion that is now generally accepted by scholars, *viz.*, that the so-called second schism of Photius never took place (see Dvornik, *Légendes de Constantin et de Méthode vues de Byzance*, Prague, 1933, and in *Byzantion*, t. VIII, fasc. 2, 1933; and Grumel in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, t. XXII, pp. 432-457, 1933). There was a dispute, and a very grave one, between him and Pope Nicholas I, but from the time that he was recognized as canonically patriarch in 878 Photius was in peace with the Apostolic See and remained so. Moreover, neither he nor anyone else was guilty of falsifying the acts of the synod of 879-80, of which he has been freely accused, and the oecumenicity of the eighth general council comes under suspicion. After the death of Photius, " Pope John IX clearly recognized the legitimacy of his second period as patriarch ", declares Father Grumel, " . . . All this means that the second schism of Photius is an event that must be expunged from the story of his life and the history of the Church ".

How did this legend arise? It was put into shape by Cardinal Baronius in the sixteenth century and fixed by Hergenröther and Hefele; but Baronius, of course in perfect good faith, relied on an old but vitiated source. The whole story depends on an appendix of documents attached to the acts of the eighth general council, which Dvornik and Grumel show to be nothing else than an anti-Photian *dossier* of doctored and even false texts compiled as propaganda by a fanatical group at Constantinople of those who were partizans of the memory of the patriarch Ignatius (a good but tactless man). These are the real Byzantine schismatics of the late ninth century, opponents both of the Holy See and of their own patriarch Photius.

The schism of 1054 has also come under fire. Anyone who reads the history of the Eastern church during the later middle ages in some detail will be forced to ask himself why this date rather than 1472 (the formal repudiation of the union of Florence by Constantinople) is esteemed to mark the definitive separation of the East; but the dramatic (not to say theatrical) excommunication of Michael Cerularius on 16 July, 1054, has a compelling power (the present writer confesses to having succumbed to it, and in print). Nevertheless, as Father Jugie points out (*Echos d'Orient*, no. 188, pp. 440-473, 1937), at the time that Cardinal Humbert and the other legates excommunicated Cerularius the pope from whom they had received their powers, St. Leo IX, was dead, and it is arguable that they no longer represented the Holy See; it is also arguable that Leo would not have approved of their violent action; it is certain that Cardinal Humbert was not an expert theologian, that he was very ill-informed about the East, and that " he brought against Cerularius and his supporters, and indirectly

against all the Byzantines, not only well-founded complaints but also accusations of a whole series of imaginary heresies and crimes ".

Abbé Amann had already written against the anti-Photian *dossier* in his articles on Popes John VIII and IX in the *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique,* and he has adopted the new conclusions concerning Photius in his recently published volume in the *Histoire de l'Eglise* of A. Fliche and V. Martin. It is highly desirable that our own English text-books of ecclesiastical history and encyclopaedias and other reference books should be brought up to date in the same sense, for the sake of historical truth, in justice to our separated Eastern brethren (who revere the memory of that undoubtedly great man Photius), and in the interests of improved relations between us. At the same time our history books etc., might well pay far more attention than they do to the action of secular politics in precipitating *and deliberately maintaining* heresy and schism; a special aspect of this is dealt with in an admirable article by Christopher Dawson in the current *Colosseum,* " The Social Factor in the Problem of Christian Unity ".

The Eastern Orthodox Church, forced by the conquering Turks to break with Rome, has unquestionably been out of communion with the Holy See since 1472, in effect continuously (except the church of Antioch, part of which with its patriarch finally returned to unity in 1724 and so remains), but it is increasingly clear that the attitude of Catholics in her regard has been far from faultless. In the words of Professor Grégoire, " It is time that we all knew that certain Catholic scholars, with the praise and encouragement of the Holy See, are destroying, by means of a minute analysis of facts, the most obstinate prejudices of the West against the East, and showing that that East, which Rome until recently labelled with the contemptuous epithet of 'schismatic', should be known to us simply as Orthodox, without inverted commas, not only in charity but out of respect for historical truth ".

The whole subject is dealt with at some length in Professor Amann's fine volume on the Carolingian epoch, which is the first instalment in the Fliche-Martin *Histoire* to be entrusted to a single writer.

**CATHOLICISM, COMMUNISM AND DICTATORSHIP. By C. J. Eustace. New York, Benziger Brothers. 1938. Pp. 149.**

This essay, the material of which was gathered by a group of laymen under the direction of their chaplain, exposes the underlying tenets of the false and the true totalitarianism. Father J. A. Keating, S.J., has written the foreword.

It is evident to any student of contemporary history that the world is moving toward some form of collectivism. The origin of

the proletariat springs from the belief, real or fancied, that the man of the Western world fears that he is losing his value as a person. In the true sense, man's value as a person lies in knowing, loving and serving God. In a word, humanistic doctrines in politics have failed. Individualism no longer holds the high hopes it once promised, and the world is turning to Fascism, Communism, Nazism, for the security which it believes these can offer by some form of solidarity.

But do these modern doctrines really contain the security they pretend to have? The author exposes the fundamental principles of the various forms of totalitarianism with telling logic and knowledge of their teachings that are admirable. Not always profound, but nevertheless clearly presented, the author offers a suitable book for the educated man who desires to learn fundamentals.

Human society, from the time of Plato and Aristotle down through the Middle Ages to our own day, receives illuminating treatment. Antecedents, causes and occasions of the systems now in vogue are briefly analyzed by the author.

Many of the long-revered myths of the liberals, namely, the lack of progress in Catholic countries, the art and science of our industrial civilization, the condemnation of all other forms of government in the name of democarcy, fall before the author's trenchant pen and sound logic.

The book is written in an easy, readable style, not too technical, but always scientific without sacrificing the interest of the untrained reader. It is a work that should be widely read because of the thought it is bound to provoke and the knowledge it will afford. The theme that man must return to the primacy of the spiritual makes it worth while.

**ETHICS — FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY. By the Reverend J. Elliot Ross, Ph.D. New York, Devin-Adair. 1938. Pp. 368.**

This book is a completely revised edition of the author's widely used *Christian Ethics* (1919), intended for the novice in philosophy. One will not find a great deal of speculative thought in it; nor is it even completely concerned with the *practico-practice* of Ethics. The author often goes astray from the path of that science to admonish his readers to cultivate this or that virtue. This tendency to preach is especially noticeable when the author mentions anything about intoxicating drink. This is a praiseworthy purpose, but it does not belong in a book devoted to Ethics.

The book falls into three divisions: fundamental, individual and social Ethics, the last of which covers more than half of the book.

In developing these parts of Ethics the author disregards the order which St. Thomas follows in his Ia-IIae. This is a fault in any work purposing to be " from the standpoint of Scholastic Philosophy."

If Ethics is to be built upon solid ground it must begin with an exhaustive treatise on the end and purpose of man. Only after this is well understood should human acts come into the picture. There is a tract on habits in this book, but to call it Scholastic is to distort the meaning of the word. The Angelic Doctor's treatise on habits (Ia-IIae, 49-54) is still the best explanation we have of this difficult and important matter. Sufficient attention is not paid to the virtues in general.

Perhaps the most difficult subject in Ethics is concerned with the essence of morality; yet here again Dr. Ross's treatment is perfunctory. This first part of the work should be the most important as the principles it lays down recur throughout the whole science of Ethics.

The second part of the work abounds with a curious mixture of Ethics, Moral Theology, and hints on character development. The author exhibits a tendency to quote copiously from various poets to illustrate a point or to inspire imitation in the reader. This device might well have been left to the ingenuity of the individual teacher.

Social Ethics, the third part of the work, is by far the best of the volume. There the author discusses the various problems which are proving so difficult for the modern world. But if these difficulties are to find a solution, they will require the principles that were too hastily treated in the first part of the work.

A complete explanation of the Thomistic definition of society would add to this portion of the work. Only when men truly understand the nature of society, will they be able to build a lasting social structure.

Just why the author should discuss charity in a book on Ethics is rather difficult to understand. The chapter on labor is well worth while; the observations are pertinent.

In character this book is popular rather than scientific. It is written in an easy style, well interspersed with good examples. At the end of every chapter there is a list of books suggested, and several questions on the preceding chapter. There is a bibliography and a good index.

Father Ross is not happy in his choice of sources, many of which are drawn from the all-too-numerous manuals. Not even the more modern writers of manuals such as Davis, Prümmer, Merkelbach, in morals, and Gredt in philosophy come in for a mention. St. Thomas rates an occasional footnote, but for the most part the author is a reluctant Thomist. We shall never be able to develop a tradition of speculative thought as long as our text-book authors persist in using secondary sources. It is to be regretted that the author did not better

utilize the opportunity at hand to give the English-speaking world a first-class book on Ethics.

Despite its shortcomings, the book will undoubtedly find a wide circle of readers, many of whom will derive much knowledge from it. At least it lets the reader know that there is a science of Ethics.

**L'HYSTORE JOB. Adaptation en vers francais du Compendium in Job de Pierre de Blois. Editee par Robert Chapman Bates. New Haven: Yale University Press. Pp. xxx + 293.**

The *Moralia* of Gregory the Great had an enormous influence on subsequent medieval thought and letters. Especially noteworthy is the compendium which the testy Peter of Blois made in the twelfth century at the request of England's Henry II, who wanted to learn patience. Peter lashed out violently against the faults of those about him and, *noblesse oblige*, Peter was lashed in turn. About a hundred years later an unknown monk used this compendium to make a free poetic adaptation in the Picard dialect. The poem, *L'Hystore Job*, is extant in a single manuscript, which Mr. Bates now edits for the first time.

The poem of 3336 eight-syllable verses in rhyme is a rare sort of sermon. As the editor proves, it was intended for oral presentation, presumably to an audience of monks or clerics. The poet skips none of the sins that Peter mentions, and finds some new vices to inveigh against.

Dr. Bates gives the corresponding passage of Peter of Blois at the foot of each page of the text. He does not study the language of the poem, since to some extent that has been previously done. He has written an excellent introduction and adds a series of literary and historical notes as well as a glossary of all the words in the poem.

For the readers of the REVIEW who are not especially interested in Old French, the information on medieval preaching will prove interesting, although it is derived from the familiar bibliography on that subject. The moderately easy Picard text of the poem, together with the glossary, may invite some to deepen their reading knowledge of medieval French.

On page x for Bois read Blois, and one wonders what the author can mean on page xxix by " la fin de cette periode de décadence intellectuelle et artistique qu' était le trezième (siècle)".

# Book Notes

*The Faith in Practice,* by Fr. Philip Hughes, states and explains briefly the content of Catholic teaching. Entirely expository, it leaves out the defensive and the positive portions of Catholic theology. The book is divided into five parts, the first two of which deal with the fundamental dogmas, the third with the Sacraments, and the last two with the Christian virtues. Incidentally, the five-part division adopted by the author does very little to aid the effectiveness of the book. It belongs to a class of books with which the cultured Catholic should become familiar. Because of its clarity and accuracy it must be numbered among the best in its class. It can be recommended to a Catholic layman or to an enquirer as embodying a correct, and in the matter of individual moral, a fairly complete manual of Catholic teaching. (Longmans, Green & Co., New York.)

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Dan Gilbert, whose explosively journalistic books on naturalism in American colleges have had a wide sale, comes out with a "study of Communism and cowardice," *Our Chameleon Comrades,* which shows the cowardly campaign being waged by Communists to mislead the workers and those who would work if they could get it. Mr. Browder, the author contends, has bowed and scraped before the altar of Americanism and compromised every tenet of Marxism by his lip-service to democracy and in "his prostitution of the 'Party' to the task of truckling to the prejudices and preposessions of the 'petty bourgeoisie'". Mr. Gilbert gives authorities for most of his statements, but the violence of his style makes the book unacceptable to many. The omission of an index is another indication that the book is meant for popular reading rather than for study and reference. (San Diego, Cal. The Danielle Publishers, pp. 175).

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Volume XI (November) of Butler's *The Lives of the Saints,* edited and revised by the Rev. Herbert Thurston and Donald Attwater, is on the stands. Mr. Attwater has supplied the text, while Father Thurston is responsible for the footnotes and bibliographical references. This volume is quite on a par with the others of the series and that is sufficient recommendation. (New York, P. J. Kenedy & Sons. Pp. xii + 355.)

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*The Fine Gold of the Old Testament* is a series of readings from the Douay Bible selected by Father I. J. Semper for the use of college students, study clubs and educated readers generally. In addition to the readings, selected for religious content and literary form, the book contains a brief introduction to the Old Testament and short explanatory notes on the text. The book can be recommended to those who would consider reading the entire Old Testament a chore. (Dubuque, Iowa: Columbia College Press. Pp. xviii + 284.)

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It is no easy thing to prepare conferences for a retreat for young women of school-leaving age. Father Aloysius Roche has made a selection of conferences that he gave on various occasions and published them under the title *Talks for Young Women.* The talks were prepared for English young ladies, but American priests will find many helpful hints for the preparation of their own conferences. (St. Louis, Mo., B. Herder Book Co. Pp. 158.)

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The late Monsignor Kerby's *The Considerate Priest,* companion volume of his *The Better Hope,* has so well approved itself to the priests of the United States that the second printing of this clerical classic is already called for. (The Dolphin Press, Philadelphia.)

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The Rev. Thomas J. McKugo presents a monograph which will delight the professional theologian: *De Relatione inter Caritatem Augustinianam et Gratiam Actualem* (Mundelein, Illinois, Apud Aedes Seminarii Sanctae Mariae ad Lacum, 1936; pp. ii + 63).

The problem which Fr. McKugo investigates is the Bishop of Hippo's indiscriminate application of the word *charity* to sanctifying grace and actual grace. An analysis of the theology of the *Doctor Gratiae* displays a clear distinction between the concepts of in-

dwelling charity and actual grace. Actual grace, the author finds, is called charity only because it is given to help us perform an *actus imperatus virtute caritatis*. Neo-Platonist influence is responsible for this confusion of terms.

The reader will find that this study is characterized by clear presentation, exact thinking and argumentation.

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The professors of philosophy of the College of St. John Berchmans at Pullach near Muenchen are replacing Fr. Alphonse Lehmen's outmoded series of philosophical text books. The first volume of a projected set of eight has appeared under the title *Denken und Sein*, by Joseph de Vries, S.J. (Freiburg in Breisgau, Herder & Co. 1937; pp. x + 304.)

This book is an outstanding manual of epistemology. It would be difficult to name a modern German manual of instruction of greater philosophical penetration and balance. The chapter which treats of induction is a masterpiece of German scholarly thoroughness. Savants will, however, notice the conspicuous absence of the names of the English-speaking philosophers who have developed the field of the theory of knowledge in the recent past.

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*La Percluse Heroïque* by Paulin Renault is a short life of the Foundress of the Sisters of Notre Dame de Namur. The author has an eye to the romance and drama in Blessed Julie Billiart's life and emphasizes that aspect. Because of this pronounced flair for the romantic and the dramatic, the book will appeal to a limited number of American readers. (Brussels, L'Edition Universelle S. A. Pp. 227.)

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*Laien Bibel*, a careful selection of the most important passages of the Bible, aims to tell the reader about the main facts of the Bible. Its careful selections and concise explanations of the more difficult parts serve to further the primary purpose of the volume, which is to reach the mind and heart of common folks. There is also a conscious correlation of the Bible and the texts as found in the liturgical prayers of the Church. In Germany, where at present it is difficult to impart the truths of faith in public instruction, this excellent volume will serve to keep the faithful in touch with Holy Writ. (Herder & Co., Freiburg; pp. xxiii + 1038.)

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*Handbuch zur Schulbibel* by Karl Kastner is designed as a guide for instructions in schools of higher learning. This Bible is intended to be the direct source for a varied series of instructions. Of special interest is the author's application of the Sacred Scriptures to the educational principle of Catholic universalism. No less attractive is the well developed reference to the Bible and Liturgy, the Bible and Art, and the Bible and Life. A complete index and bibliography, *Literaturverzeichniss* will aid the preacher in the ready use of this excellent volume. (Herder, St. Louis, Mo., pp. xxxv + 508.)

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In *Leben spricht zu Leben*, compiled by Dr. Gertrud Ehrle, readers of German will find an interesting collection of letters on the various vocations in life that are open to women. These actual letters, written at the invitation of Dr. Ehrle by women of all ages and states of life, recount the struggles and difficulties and success experienced by the writers in their chosen vocation. School teachers, shop girls, stenographers, nurses and others tell in simple and sincere language their life's story, and in so doing present a variegated pattern of human experience that holds the attention of the reader throughout. The book should prove of special interest to young women who find themselves confronted with the task of choosing a vocation. (Herder and Co., St. Louis, Mo.; pp. viii + 236.)

# Books Received

THE CHURCH AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. By the Reverend Raymond Corrigan, S.J., Ph.D. Preface by the Reverend Joseph Husslein, S.J., Ph.D., General Editor, Science and Culture Series. The Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 1938. Pp. xviii + 326. Price, $3.50.

INTRODUCTIO IN CODICEM. Paravit et Edidit R. P. Adalricus Beste, O.S.B., J.C.D. Saint John's University, Collegeville, Minnesota. 1938. Pp. 1000. Price, $5.00.

THE SPANISH WAR AND LYING PROPAGANDA. By the Reverend Joseph B. Code. The Paulist Press, New York City. 1938. Pp. 48. Price, 5c.

A PERSONALIST MANIEFSTO. By Emmanuel Mounier. Translated from the French by Monks of Saint John's Abbey. Longmans, Green & Company, New York City. 1938. Pp. xxii + 298. Price, $2.00.

STORIES FROM THE OLD TESTAMENT. Adapted and Illustrated by Maud and Miska Petersham. The John C. Winston Company, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 1938. Pp. 125. Price, $2.75.

SAINT BRAULIO, HIS LIFE AND WRITINGS. By the Reverend Charles H. Lynch, Ph.D. The Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C. 1938. Pp. xii + 276. Price, $2.00.

THE BLESSED VIRGIN MARY AS MEDIATRIX IN LATIN AND OLD FRENCH LEGEND. By Sister Mary V. Gripkey, Ph.D. The Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C. 1938. Pp. x + 238.

MEDIEVAL HANDBOOKS OF PENANCE. A Translation of the Principal libri poenitentiales and selections from related documents. By John T. McNeill and Helena M. Gramer. Columbia University Press, New York City. 1938. Pp. xiv + 476. Price, $4.75.

ANNUS MYSTICO-AUGUSTINIANUS. Auctore R. P. Mag. Fr. Nazareni Petrelli, O.S.A. Volumen I a die I Mensis Januarii ad Junii. Editio Secunda. Casa Editrice Marietti, Roma, Italia. 1938. Pp. xix + 435. Prezzo, Lib. It. 8.

MEDITATIONES DE UNIVERSA HISTORIA DOMINICAE PASSIONIS. Auctore R. P. F. Costero, S.J. Casa Editrice Marietti, Roma, Italia. 1938. Pp. vii + 292. Prezzo, Lib. It. 4.

SANCTI AURELII AUGUSTINI CONFESSIONUM LIBRI XIII. Cum notis P. H. Wangnereck, S.J. Editio VIII. Casa Editrice Marietti, Roma, Italia. 1938. Pp. xvi + 586. Prezzo, Lib. It. 7.

CIRCULUS PHILOSOPHICUS SEU OBJECTIONUM CUMULATA COLLECTIO. Iuxta methodum scholasticam. Vol. V: Theodicea. Auctore, Caesare Carbone. Casa Editrice Marietti, Roma, Italia. 1938. Pp. viii + 663. Prezzo, Lib. It. 25.

ORDO IUDICIALIS PROCESSUS CANONICI SUPER NULLITATE MATRIMONII INSTRUENDI. Iuxta Instructionem a S. C. de Sacramentis editam. Auctore, R. P. Ivo Benedetti. Casa Editrice Marietti, Roma, Italia. Novissima editio, 1938. Pp. 220. Prezzo, Lib. It. 12.

LES EVANGILES DU DIMANCHE, EXPLIQUÉS ET COMMENTÉS. Par Chanoine P. Magaud. P. Téqui et Fils, Paris, France. 1938. Pp. 402. Prix, 15 fr.

CRESTOMATHIA BERNARDINA. Ex operibus S. Bernardi, Abbatis Claravellensis Doctoris Melliflui, collecta et ad systema quoddam theologiae redacta. Compilatore P. Dr. Emerico Piszter, S.O.Cist. Casa Editrice Marietti, Roma, Italia. Editio Secunda, 1938. Pp. viii + 392. Prezzo, Lib. It. 10.

LE MEILLEUR MOMENT POUR ETRE PRETRE. Par Mgr. Millot, Vicaire général de Versailles. P. Téqui et Fils, Paris, France. 1938. Pp. ix + 192. Prix, 12 fr.